
















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 

























All rights reserved 
ABSTRACT 
Hedge Fund Essays 
Sergiy Gorovyy 
 
This dissertation analyzes hedge fund leverage and its determinants, investigates optimal hedge 
fund manager behavior induced by hedge fund contracts, and uncovers an evidence of a hedge 
fund transparency risk premium. The first essay investigates the leverage of hedge funds in the 
time series and cross-section. Hedge fund leverage is found to be counter-cyclical to the leverage 
of listed financial intermediaries. Changes in hedge fund leverage tend to be more predictable by 
economy-wide factors than by fund-specific characteristics. In particular, decreases in funding 
costs and increases in market values both forecast increases in hedge fund leverage.  Decreases 
in fund return volatilities predict future increases in leverage. In the second essay, I investigate 
hedge fund compensation from an investor's point of view in a model with a risk neutral fund 
manager who can continuously rebalance the fund's holdings. I solve for the optimal leverage 
level in a fund that has a compensation contract with a high-water mark and hurdle rate 
provisions where management and performance fees are paid at discrete time moments. The 
compensation contract induces risk-loving behavior with managers often choosing the maximum 
leverage. Third essay investigates risk premia associated with hedge fund transparency, liquidity, 
complexity, and concentration over the period from April 2006 to March 2009. Consistent with 
factor models of risk, we find that during normal times low-transparency, low-liquidity, and 
high-concentration funds delivered a return premium, with economic magnitudes of 5% to 10% 
per year, while during bad states of the economy, these funds experienced significantly lower 
returns. We also offer a novel explanation for why highly concentrated funds command a risk 
premium by revealing that the risk premium is mostly prevalent among non-transparent funds 
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21. Introduction
The events of the financial crisis over 2007–2009 have made clear the importance of
leverage of financial intermediaries to both asset prices and the overall economy. The ob-
served “deleveraging” of many listed financial institutions during this period has been the
focus of many regulators and the subject of much research.1 The role of hedge funds has
played a prominent role in these debates for several reasons. First, although in the recent
financial turbulence no single hedge fund has caused a crisis, the issue of systemic risks
inherent in hedge funds has been lurking since the failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Cap-
ital Management L.P. (LTCM) in 1998.2 Second, within the asset management industry, the
hedge fund sector makes the most use of leverage. In fact, the relatively high and sophis-
ticated use of leverage is a defining characteristic of the hedge fund industry. Third, hedge
funds are large counterparties to the institutions directly overseen by regulatory authorities,
especially commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions which have
received large infusions of capital from governments.
However, while we observe the leverage of listed financial intermediaries through peri-
odic accounting statements and reports to regulatory authorities, little is known about hedge
fund leverage despite the proposed regulations of hedge funds in the U.S. and Europe. This
is because hedge funds are by their nature secretive, opaque, and have little regulatory over-
sight. Leverage plays a central role in hedge fund management. Many hedge funds rely on
leverage to enhance returns on assets which on an unlevered basis would not be sufficiently
high to attract funding. Leverage amplifies or dampens market risk and allows funds to ob-
tain notional exposure at levels greater than their capital base. Leverage is often employed by
hedge funds to target a level of return volatility desired by investors. Hedge funds use lever-
age to take advantage of mispricing opportunities by simultaneously buying assets which are
1 See, for example, Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and
He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010), among many others.
2 Systemic risks of hedge funds are discussed by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets
(1999), Chan et al. (2007), Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007), Financial Stability Forum (2007), and
Banque de France (2007).
3perceived to be underpriced and shorting assets which are perceived to be overpriced. Hedge
funds also dynamically manipulate leverage to respond to changing investment opportunity
sets.
We are the first paper, to our knowledge, to formally investigate hedge fund leverage us-
ing actual leverage ratios with a unique data set from a fund-of-hedge-funds. We track hedge
fund leverage in time series from December 2004 to October 2009, a period which includes
the worst periods of the financial crisis from 2008 to early 2009. We characterize the cross-
section of leverage: we examine the dispersion of leverage across funds and investigate the
macro and fund-specific determinants of future leverage changes. We compare the leverage
and exposure of hedge funds with the leverage and total assets of listed financial companies.
As well as characterizing leverage at the aggregate level, we investigate the leverage of hedge
fund sectors.
The prior works on hedge fund leverage are only estimates (see, e.g., Banque de France,
2007; Lo, 2008) or rely only on static leverage ratios reported by hedge funds to the main
databases. For example, leverage at a point in time is used by Schneeweis et al. (2004) to
investigate the relation between hedge fund leverage and returns. Indirect estimates of hedge
fund leverage are computed by McGuire and Tsatsaronis (2008) using factor regressions with
time-varying betas. Even without considering the sampling error in computing time-varying
factor loadings, this approach requires that the complete set of factors be correctly specified,
otherwise the implied leverage estimates suffer from omitted variable bias. Regressions can
also not adequately capture abrupt changes in leverage. Other work by Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010), and others, cites
margin requirements, or haircuts, as supporting evidence of time-varying leverage taken by
proprietary trading desks at investment banks and hedge funds. These margin requirements
give maximum implied leverage, not the actual leverage that traders are using. In contrast,
we analyze actual leverage ratios of hedge funds.
Our work is related to several large literatures, some of which have risen to new promi-
nence with the financial crisis. First, our work is related to optimal leverage management by
hedge funds. Duffie, Wang, and Wang (2008) and Dai and Sundaresan (2010) derive theo-
4retical models of optimal leverage in the presence of management fees, insolvency losses,
and funding costs and restrictions at the fund level. At the finance sector level, Acharya and
Viswanathan (2008) study optimal leverage in the presence of moral hazard and liquidity
effects showing that due to deleveraging, bad shocks that happen in good times are more
severe. A number of authors have built equilibrium models where leverage affects the entire
economy. In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), economy-wide equilibrium leverage rises in
times of low volatility and falls in periods where uncertainty is high and agents have very
disperse beliefs. Leverage amplifies liquidity losses and leads to overvalued assets during
normal times. Stein (2009) shows that leverage can be chosen optimally by individual hedge
funds, but this can create a fire-sale externality causing systemic risk by hedge funds simul-
taneously unwinding positions and reducing leverage. There are also many models where
the funding available to financial intermediaries, and hence leverage, affects asset prices. In
many of these models, deleveraging cycles are a key part of the propagating mechanism of
shocks.3 Finally, a large literature in corporate finance examines how companies determine
optimal leverage. Recently, Welch (2004) studies the determinants of firm debt ratios and
finds that approximately two-thirds of variation in corporate leverage ratios is due to net
issuing activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by defining
and describing several features of hedge fund leverage. Section 3 describes our data. Section
4 outlines the estimation methodology which allows us to take account of missing values.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The Mechanics of Hedge Fund Leverage
2.1. Gross, Net, and Long-only Leverage
A hedge fund holds risky assets in long and short positions together with cash. Leverage
measures the extent of the relative size of the long and short positions in risky assets relative
3 See, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002), He and Krishnamurthy (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), and Adrian and Shin (2010).
5to the size of the portfolio. Cash can be held in both a long position or a short position, where
the former represents short-term lending and the latter represents short-term borrowing. The
assets under management (AUM) of the fund is cash plus the difference between the fund’s
long and short positions and is the value of the claim all investors have on the fund. The net
asset value (NAV) per share is the value of the fund per share and is equal to AUM divided
by the number of shares. We use the following three definitions of leverage, which are also
widely used in industry:
Gross leverage is the sum of long and short exposure per share divided by NAV. This defini-
tion implicitly treats both the long and short positions as separate sources of profits in their
own right, as would be the case for many long-short equity funds. This leverage measure
overstates risk if the short position is used for hedging and does not constitute a separate
active bet. If the risk of the short position by itself is small, or the short position is usually
taken together with a long position, a more appropriate definition of leverage can be:
Net leverage is the difference between long and short exposure per share expressed as a
proportion of NAV. The net leverage measure captures only the long positions representing
active positions which are not perfectly offset by short hedges, assuming the short positions
represent little risk by themselves. Finally, we consider,
Long-only leverage or Long leverage is defined as the long positions per share divided by
NAV. Naturally, by ignoring the short positions, long-only leverage could result in a large
underestimate of leverage, but we examine this conservative measure because the report-
ing requirements of hedge fund positions by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) involve only long positions.4 We also investigate if long leverage behaves differently
from gross or net leverage, or put another way, if hedge funds actively manage their long and
short leverage positions differently.
Only a fund 100% invested in cash has a leverage of zero for all three leverage defi-
nitions. Furthermore, for a fund employing only levered long positions, all three leverage
4 Regulation 13-F filings are required by any institutional investor managing more than $100 million. Using
these filings, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) examine long-only hedge fund positions in technology stocks
during the late 1990s bull market.
6measure coincide. Thus, active short positions induce differences between gross, net, and
long-only leverage. Appendix A illustrates these definitions of leverage for various hedge
fund portfolios.
2.2. How do Hedge Funds Obtain Leverage?
Hedge funds obtain leverage through a variety of means, which depend on the type of
securities traded by the hedge fund, the creditworthiness of the fund, and the exchange, if
any, on which the securities are traded. Often leverage is provided by a hedge fund’s prime
broker, but not all hedge funds use prime brokers.5 By far the vast majority of leverage is
obtained through short-term funding as there are very few hedge funds able to directly issue
long-term debt or secure long-term borrowing.
In the U.S., regulations govern the maximum leverage permitted in many exchange-
traded markets. The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation T (Reg T) allows investors to
borrow up to a maximum 50% of a position on margin (which leads to a maximum level
of exposure equal to 1/0.5 = 2). For a short position, Reg T requires that short-sale ac-
counts hold collateral of 50% of the value of the short implying a maximum short exposure
of two. By establishing offshore investment vehicles, hedge funds can obtain “enhanced
leverage” higher than levels allowable by Reg T. Prime brokers have established facilities
overseas in less restrictive jurisdictions to provide this service. Another way to obtain higher
leverage than allowed by Reg T is “portfolio margining” which is another service provided
by prime brokers. Portfolio margining was approved by the SEC in 2005 and allows margins
to be calculated on a portfolio basis, rather than on a security-by-security basis.6
Table 1 reports typical margin requirements (“haircuts”) required by prime brokers or
other counterparties. The last column of the Table 1 lists the typical levels of leverage able to
5 In addition to providing financing for leverage, prime brokers provide hedge fund clients with risk manage-
ment services, execution, custody, daily account statements, and short-sale inventory for stock borrowing. In
some cases, prime brokers provide office space, computing and trading infrastructure, and can even contribute
capital.
6 Portfolio margining only applies to “hardwired” relations, such as calls and puts on a stock, and the under-
lying stock itself, rather than to any statistical correlations between different assets.
7be obtained in each security market, that are the inverse of the margin requirements. These
are obtained at March 2010 by collating information from prime brokers and derivatives
exchanges.7 Note that some financial instruments, such as derivatives and options, have
embedded leverage in addition to the leverage available from external financing. The highest
leverage is available in Treasury, foreign exchange, and derivatives security markets such as
interest rate and foreign exchange swaps. These swap transactions are over the counter and
permit much higher levels of leverage than Reg T. These securities enable investors to have
large notional exposure with little or no initial investment or collateral. Similarly, implied
leverage is high in futures markets because the margin requirements there are much lower
than in the equity markets.
Based on the dissimilar margin requirements of different securities reported in Table 1,
it is not surprising that hedge fund leverage is heterogeneous and depends on the type of
investment strategy employed by the fund. Our results below show that funds engaged in
relative value strategies, which trade primarily fixed income, swaps, and other derivatives,
have the highest average gross leverage of 4.8 through the sample. Some relative value
funds in our sample have gross leverage greater than 30. Credit funds which primarily hold
investment grade and high yield corporate bonds and credit derivatives have an average gross
leverage of 2.4 in our sample. Hedge funds in the equity and event-driven strategies mainly
invest in equity and distressed corporate debt and hence have lower leverage. In particular,
equity and event-driven funds have average gross leverage of 1.6 and 1.3, respectively, over
our sample.
The cost of leverage to hedge funds depends on the method used to obtain leverage.
Prime brokers typically charge a spread over London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to
hedge fund clients who are borrowing to fund their long positions and brokers pay a spread
below LIBOR for cash deposited by clients as collateral for short positions. These spreads
are higher for less creditworthy funds and are also higher when securities being financed have
high credit risk or are more volatile. The cost of leverage through prime brokers reflects the
7 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2009) show that margin requirements changed
substantially over the financial crisis.
8costs of margin in traded derivatives markets. We include instruments capturing funding
costs like LIBOR and interest rate spreads in our analysis.
In many cases, there are maximum leverage constraints imposed by the providers of
leverage on hedge funds. Hedge fund managers make a decision on optimal leverage as
a function of the type of the investment strategy, the perceived risk-return trade-off of the
underlying trades, and the cost of obtaining leverage, all subject to exogenously imposed
leverage limits. Financing risk is another consideration as funding provided by prime bro-
kers can be subject to sudden change. In contrast, leverage obtained through derivatives
generally has lower exposure to funding risk. Prime brokers have the ability to pull financ-
ing in many circumstances, for example, when performance or NAV triggers are breached.
Dai and Sundaresan (2010) show that this structure effectively leaves the hedge funds short
an option vis-a`-vis their prime broker. Adding further risk to this arrangement is the fact that
the hedge fund is also short an option vis-a`-vis another significant financing source, their
client base, which also has the ability to pull financing following terms stipulated by the
offering memorandum.8 We do not consider the implicit leverage in these funding options
in our analysis as we are unable to obtain data on hedge fund prime broker agreements or
the full set of investment memoranda of hedge fund clients; our analysis applies only to the
leverage reported by hedge funds in their active strategies.9
2.3. Reported Hedge Fund Leverage
An important issue with hedge fund leverage is which securities are included in the firm-
wide leverage calculation and how the contribution of each security to portfolio leverage
is calculated. The most primitive form of leverage calculation is unadjusted balance sheet
leverage, which is simply the value of investment assets, not including notional exposure
8 In many cases, hedge funds have the ability to restrict outflows by invoking gates even after lockup periods
have expired (see, for example, Ang and Bollen, 2010).
9 Dudley and Nimalendran (2009) estimate funding costs and funding risks for hedge funds, which are
not directly observable, using historical data on margins from futures exchanges and Chicago Board Options
Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX). They do not consider hedge fund leverage.
9in derivatives, divided by equity capital. Since derivative exposure for hedge funds can be
large, this understates, in many cases dramatically, economic risk exposure.
To remedy this shortcoming, leverage is often adjusted for derivative exposure by taking
delta-adjusted notional values of derivative contracts.10 For example, to account for the
different volatility and beta exposures of underlying investments, hedge funds often beta-
adjust the exposures of (cash) equities by upward adjusting leverage for high-beta stock
holdings. Likewise, (cash) bond exposures are often adjusted to account for the different
exposures to interest rate factors. In particular, the contribution of bond investments to the
leverage calculation is often scaled up or down by calculating a 10-year equivalent bond
position. Thus, an investment of $100 in a bond with twice the duration of a 10-year bond
would have a position of $200 in the leverage calculation. The issues of accounting for
leverage for swaps and futures affect fixed income hedge funds the most and long-short
equity hedge funds the least. For this reason, we break down leverage statistics by hedge
fund sectors.
Funds investing primarily in futures, especially commodities, report a margin-to-equity
ratio, which is the amount of cash used to fund margin divided by the nominal trading level
of the fund. This measure is proportional to the percentage of available capital dedicated
to funding margin requirements. It is frequently used by commodity trading advisors as a
gauge of their market exposure. Other funds investing heavily in other zero-cost derivative
positions like swaps also employ similar measures based on ratios of nominal, or adjusted
nominal, exposure to collateral cash values to compute leverage.
Thus, an important caveat with our analysis is that leverage is not measured in a consis-
tent fashion across hedge funds and the hedge funds in our sample use different definitions of
leverage. Our data are also self-reported by hedge funds. These effects are partially captured
in our analysis through fund fixed effects. Our analysis focuses on the common behavior of
10 Many hedge funds account for the embedded leverage in derivatives positions through internal reporting
systems or external, third-party risk management systems like RiskMetrics. These risk system providers com-
pute risk statistics like deltas, left-hand tail measures of risk like Value-at-Risk (VAR), and implied leverage
at both the security level and the aggregate portfolio level. RiskMetrics allows hedge funds to “pass through”
their risk statistics to investors who can aggregate positions across several funds.
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We capture the predictable components of hedge fund leverage by various aggregate
market price variables, which we summarize in Appendix B. We graph two of these variables
in Fig. 1.. We plot the average cost of protection from a default of major “investment
banks” (Bear Stearns, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) computed using credit default swap (CDS)
contracts in the solid line with the scale on the left-hand axis. This is the market-weighted
cost of protection per year against default of each firm. Our selected firms are representative
of broker/dealers and investment banking activity and we refer to them as investment banks
even though many of them are commercial banks and some became commercial banks during
the sample period.
In Fig. 1. we also plot the VIX volatility index in the dotted line with the scale on
the right-hand axis. The correlation between VIX and investment bank CDS protection is
0.89. Both of these series are low at the beginning of the sample and then start to increase
in mid-2007, which coincides with the initial losses in subprime mortgages and other certain
securitized markets. In late 2008, CDS spreads and VIX increase dramatically after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, with VIX reaching a peak of 60% at the end of October
2008 and the CDS spread reaching 3.55% per annum in September 2008. In 2009, both
CDS and VIX decline after the global financial sector is stabilized.
Our other macro series are monthly returns on investment banks, monthly returns on the
S&P 500, the three-month LIBOR rate, and the three-month Treasury over Eurodollar (TED)
spread. The LIBOR and TED spreads are good proxies for the aggregate cost of short-term
borrowing for large financial institutions. Prime brokers pass on at least the LIBOR and
TED spread costs to their hedge fund clients plus a spread. Finally, we also include the term
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spread, which is the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the yield on
three-month T-bills. This captures the slope of the yield curve, which under the Expectations
Hypothesis is a forward-looking measure of future short-term interest rates and thus provides
a simple way of estimating future short-term borrowing costs.
3.2. Hedge Fund Data
Our hedge fund data are obtained from a large fund-of-hedge-funds (which we refer to
as the “Fund”). The original data set from the Fund contains over 45,000 observations of
758 funds from February 1977 to December 2009. In addition to hedge fund leverage, our
data include information on the strategy employed by the hedge funds, monthly returns,
NAVs, and AUMs. The hedge funds are broadly representative of the industry and contain
funds managed in a variety of different styles including global macro funds, fundamental
stock-picking funds, credit funds, quantitative funds, and funds investing using technical
indicators. The hedge funds invest both in specific asset classes, for example, fixed income
or equities, and also across global asset classes. Our data include both U.S. and international
hedge funds, but all returns, NAVs, and AUMs are in U.S. dollars.
An important issue is whether the hedge funds in the database exhibit a selection bias.
In particular, do the hedge funds selected by the Fund have better performance and leverage
management than a typical hedge fund? The Fund selects managers using both a “top down”
and a “bottom up” approach. The former involves selecting funds in various sector alloca-
tion bands for the Fund’s different fund-of-funds portfolios. The latter involves searching
for funds, or reallocating money across existing funds, using a primarily qualitative, propri-
etary approach. Leverage is a consideration in choosing funds, but it is only one of many
factors among the usual suspects—Sharpe (1992) ratios and other performance criteria, due
diligence considerations, network, manager quality, transparency, gates and restrictions, sec-
tor composition, investment style, etc. The Fund did not add leverage to its products and
only very rarely asked hedge funds to provide a customized volatility target or to provide
leverage which differed from the hedge funds’ existing product offerings. There is no reason
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to believe that the Fund’s selection procedure results in funds with leverage management
practices that are significantly different to the typical hedge fund.
Our Fund database includes funds that are present in TASS, CISDM, Barclay Hedge, or
other databases commonly used in research and also includes other funds which do not report
to the public hedge fund databases. This mitigates the reporting bias of the TASS database
(see Malkiel and Saha, 2005; Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao, 2008; Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang,
2010). However, the composition by sector is similar to the overall sector weighting of
the industry as reported by TASS and Barclay Hedge. Survival biases are mitigated by the
fact that often hedge funds enter the database not when they receive funds from the Fund,
but several months prior to the Fund’s investment and they often exit the database several
months after disinvestment. Our database also includes hedge funds which terminate due to
poor performance. The aggregate performance of the Fund is similar to the performance of
the main hedge fund indexes.
3.2.1. Hedge Fund Leverage
Leverage is reported by different hedge funds at various frequencies and formats, which
are standardized by the Fund. Appendix C discusses some of these formats. Most reporting
is at the monthly frequency, but some leverage numbers are reported quarterly or even less
frequently. For those funds reporting leverage at the quarterly or at lower frequencies, the
Fund is often able to obtain leverage numbers directly from the hedge fund managers at
other dates through a combination of analyst site visits and calls to hedge fund managers.
The data are of high quality because the funds undergo thorough due diligence by the Fund.
In addition, the performance and risk reports are audited, and the Fund conducts regular,
intensive monitoring of the investments made in the individual hedge funds.
3.2.2. Hedge Fund Returns, Volatilities, and Flows
We have monthly returns on all the hedge funds. These returns are actual realized returns,
rather than returns reported to the publicly available databases. In addition to examining
13
the relation between past returns and leverage, we construct volatilities from the returns.
We construct monthly hedge fund volatility using the sample standard deviation of returns
over the past 12 months. Fig. 2. plots the volatilities of all hedge funds and different
hedge fund strategies over the sample. The volatilities follow the same broad trend and are
approximately the same. This is consistent with hedge funds using leverage to scale returns
to similar volatility levels.
Fig. 2. shows that at the beginning of the sample, hedge fund volatilities were around 3%
per month and reach a low of around 2% per month in 2006. As subprime mortgages start
to deteriorate in mid-2007, hedge fund return volatility starts to increase and reaches 4–5%
per month by 2009. Volatility stays at this high level until the end of the sample in October
2009. This is because we use rolling 12-month sample volatilities which include the very
volatile, worst periods of the financial crisis 12 months prior to October 2009.
Fig. 3. compares the rolling 12-month volatilities of hedge fund returns in the data sam-
ple with the rolling 12-month volatilities of hedge fund returns in the Hedge Fund Research,
Inc. (HFR) database for the December 2004 – October 2009 time period. We observe that the
average volatilities of hedge funds in the data closely track the median hedge fund volatility
in the HFR database. Thus, the Fund’s hedge funds have very similar return behavior as the
typical hedge fund reported on the publicly available databases. Since hedge funds often
use leverage to target particular levels of volatility, this partially alleviates concerns that the
Fund’s hedge funds have atypical leverage policies.
In addition to hedge fund volatility, we also use hedge fund flows as a control variable.
We construct hedge fund-level flows over the past three months using the return and AUM




− (1 +Rt−2)(1 +Rt−1)(1 +Rt), (1)
where F lowt is the past three-month flow in the hedge fund, AUMt is assets under man-
agement at time t, and Rt is the hedge fund return from t − 1 to t. The flow formula in Eq.
(1) is used by Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik (2009), among others. We compute three-month flows, as the flows over the past
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month tend to be very volatile. We also compute past three-month hedge fund flows for the
aggregate hedge fund industry as measured by the Barclay Hedge database using Eq. (1).
3.3. Summary Statistics
We clean the raw data from the Fund and impose two filters. First, often investments are
made by the Fund in several classes of shares of a given hedge fund. All of these share classes
have almost identical returns and leverage ratios. We use the share class with the longest
history or the share class representing the largest AUM. Our second filter is that we require
funds to have at least two years of leverage observations. The final sample spans December
2004 to October 2009 and thus, our sample includes the poor returns of quantitative funds
during Summer 2007 (see Khandani and Lo, 2007) and the financial crisis of 2008 and early
2009. There are at least 63 funds in our sample at any one time. The maximum number of
funds at any given month is 163 over the sample period.
Panel A of Table 2 lists the number of observations and number of hedge funds broken
down by strategy. The strategies are defined by the Fund and do not exactly correspond
to the sector definitions employed by TASS, Barclay Hedge, CISDM, or other hedge fund
databases (which themselves employ arbitrary sector definitions). The TASS categories of
fixed income arbitrage and convertible arbitrage fall under the Fund’s relative value sector.
In the relative value sector, hedge funds invest in both developed and emerging markets and
can also invest in a variety of different asset classes. Most of the Fund’s investments have
been in long-short equity funds in the equity category and this is also by far the largest hedge
fund sector in TASS, as reported, for example, by Chan et al. (2007). At the last month of
our sample, October 2009, the proportion of equity funds reported in Barclay Hedge, not
including multi-strategy, other, and sector-specific categories, is also over 40%.
After our data filters, there are a total of 208 unique hedge funds in our sample with
8,136 monthly observations. Over half (114) of the funds in our sample run long-short
equity strategies. The number of funds in the areas of credit and relative value are 21 and
36, respectively. The remaining 37 funds are in the event driven strategy, which are mainly
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merger arbitrage and distressed debt. The number of funds reported in Panel A of Table 2
is large enough for reliable inference when averaged across strategies and across all hedge
funds.11
In Panel B of Table 2, we report summary statistics of all the hedge fund variables ob-
served in the sample. These statistics should be carefully interpreted because they do not
sample all hedge funds at the same frequency and there are missing observations in the raw
data. Panel B reports that the average gross leverage across all hedge funds is 2.13 with a
volatility of 0.62. This volatility is computed using only observed data and the true volatility
of leverage, after estimating the unobserved values, will be lower, as we show below. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that hedge fund leverage changes over time. Even without taking into
account missing observations, this volatility is much lower than the volatility of leverage
reported in the estimations of McGuire and Tsataronis (2008) using factor regressions. This
discrepancy could possibly result from the large error in their procedure of inferring leverage
from estimated factor coefficients in regressions on short samples. Individual gross hedge
fund leverage is also persistent, with an average autocorrelation of 0.68 across all the hedge
funds. Again because of unobserved leverage ratios, this persistence is biased downwards
and we report more accurate measures of autocorrelation taking into account other predictive
variables below.
Panel B of Table 2 also reports the summary statistics for the other two leverage mea-
sures. The average net leverage of hedge funds is 0.59 and average long-only leverage is 1.36.
The raw volatilities of net leverage and long-only leverage are 0.28 and 0.38, respectively,
which are significantly lower than the volatility of gross leverage. Thus, in our analysis, we
break out gross, net, and long-only leverage separately.
The other variables reported in Panel B of Table 2 are control variables used in our
analysis. The average hedge fund return is 29 basis points per month. These returns are
autocorrelated, with an average autocorrelation of 0.24 across funds, which indicates that
out- or under-performing manager returns are persistent, as noted by Getmansky, Lo, and
11 The sample also includes commodity trading funds and global macro funds, but we do not break out
separate performance of these sectors as there are too few funds for reliable inference.
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Makarov (2004) and Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010). The returns are lower
than those reported by previous literature because our sample includes the financial crisis
during which many hedge funds did poorly.12 The average 12-month rolling volatility across
hedge funds is 2.65% per month. The volatility is computed only when all fund returns in
the previous 12 months are observed. This explains why only approximately 70% of fund
volatilities are observed. Nevertheless, our volatility estimates are close to those reported
in the literature by Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) and Chan et al. (2007),
among others.
The last two fund-specific variables we include are past three-month hedge fund flows
and log AUMs. Flows are on average positive, at 2.2% per month and exhibit a large av-
erage autocorrelation of 0.62. The average fund size over our sample is $962 million. The
median fund size is $430 million. The difference between mean and median of fund size
is explained by the presence of some large funds, with the largest funds having AUMs well
over $10 billion in just one share class. Our sample is slightly biased upwards in terms of
size compared to recent estimates such as those by Chan et al. (2007) and the Banque de
France (2007). This is due to the application of filters which tend to remove smaller funds
which are effectively different share classes of larger funds. Our filters also remove funds
which are in their infancy. These funds are likely to have lower levels of leverage, with more
onerous financing conditions, than more established funds, making the levels of our leverage
ratios conservatively biased upwards.
The last column in Panel B, Table 2 lists the proportion of months across all funds where
the variables are observed. While we always observe returns, the leverage variables are
observed approximately 80% of the time. We do not restrict our analysis to a special subset
of data where all variables are observed. Instead, our algorithm permits us to use all the
available data and to infer the leverage ratios when they are missing. We now discuss our
estimation methodology.
12 See, among many others, Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), and




We specify that leverage over at month t+ 1 for fund i, Li,t+1, is predictable at time t by
both economy-wide variables, xt, and fund-specific variables, which we collect in the vector
yi,t, in the linear regression model:13
∆Li,t+1 = ci + γ · xt + ρ · yi,t + εi,t+1, (2)
where ∆Li,t+1 = Li,t+1 − Li,t is the change in fund i leverage from t to t + 1, γ is the
vector of predictive coefficients on economy-wide variables, ρ is the vector of coefficients
on fund-specific variables, and the idiosyncratic error εi,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2) is independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across funds and time. The set of firm-specific characteristics,
yi,t, includes lagged leverage, Li,t, which allows us to estimate the degree of mean reversion
of the leverage employed by funds. We capture fund-fixed effects in the constants ci which
differ across each fund.
We estimate the parameters θ = (ci γ ρ σ2) using a Bayesian algorithm which also per-
mits estimates of non-observed leverage and other fund-specific variables. Appendix D
contains details of this estimation. Briefly, the estimation method treats the non-reported
variables as additional parameters to be inferred along with θ. As an important byproduct,
the estimation supplies posterior means of leverage ratios where these are unobserved in the
data. We use these estimates, combined with the observed leverage ratios, to obtain time-
series estimates of aggregate hedge fund leverage and leverage for each sector. Since we use
uninformative priors, the special case where both the regressors and regressands in Eq. (2)
are all observed in the data is equivalent to running standard ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression.
An advantage of our procedure is that we are able to use all observations after imposing
the data filters. Using OLS would result in very few funds and observations because both
13 We also investigate the forecastability of proportional leverage changes, ∆Li,t+1/(1 + Li,t), in the same
regression specification of Eq. (2). The results are very similar to the results for leverage changes.
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the complete set of regressors and the regressand must be observed. Taking only observed
leverage produces a severely biased sample as different types of funds report at quarterly or
lower frequencies versus the monthly frequency. Sudden stops in leverage reporting corre-
late with unexpected bad performance. Linearly interpolating unobserved leverage produces
estimates that are too smooth because it relies on filling in points based on the mean rever-
sion properties of leverage alone. We show below that other variables significantly predict
leverage, both in the time series and cross-section.
4.2. Contemporaneous Model
The model in Eq. (2) is a predictive model where leverage over the next period is fore-
castable by macro and fund-specific variables at the beginning of the period. We consider an
alternative model where leverage is determined contemporaneously with instruments:
Li,t = ci + γ · xt + ρ · yi,t + ǫi,t, (3)
where we use the same set of macro variables in xt as in the predictive model (2), but we
now assume that the fund-specific variables, yi,t, do not include lagged leverage.
In Eq. (3), the potential observable determinants of leverage like VIX, interest rate
spreads, hedge fund flows, etc. in xt and yi,t are persistent. The unobserved determinants,
which are in the error term ǫi,t, are also likely to be persistent so we specify that the errors
are serially correlated and follow
ǫt = φǫǫt−1 + vt, (4)
where vt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2). It can be shown that accounting for the persistence in the
regressands in Eq. (3) through VAR or autoregressive specifications produces a reduced-
form model of the same form as Eq. (2), except without a lagged leverage term. The relation
between Eq. (2) and (3) involves the persistence of the regressands and the strength of
the serial correlation, φǫ, of the error terms. Appendix D describes the estimation of the
contemporaneous system and compares it with the predictive model.
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The contemporaneous model (3) can be used to test various theories on the determinants
of hedge fund leverage. It is important to note, however, that Eq (3) is not a structural model.
Many of the fund-specific variables, and perhaps some of the macro variables, are jointly
endogenously determined with hedge fund leverage. Put another way, while Eq. (3) can shed
light on contemporaneous correlations between hedge fund leverage and various instruments,
it is silent on causation. We can expect that some variables that are contemporaneously
associated with hedge fund leverage in Eq. (3) can have the opposite sign when used as a
predictor of hedge fund leverage in Eq. (2). Some of this can be due to the effect of the
serially correlated errors in the contemporaneous specification or that the contemporaneous
vs. predictive relations between certain variables and leverage are indeed different.
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Time Series of Leverage
5.1.1. Gross Leverage
We begin our analysis by presenting the time series of gross leverage of hedge funds.
This is obtained using the model in Eq. (2) with all macro and fund-specific variables and
fund-fixed effects. We graph gross hedge fund leverage for all hedge funds and the hedge
fund sectors in Fig. 4.. We report the posterior mean of gross leverage across all hedge funds
in the solid line. Gross leverage is stable at approximately 2.3 until mid-2007 where it starts
to decrease from 2.6 in June 2007 to a minimum of 1.4 in March 2009. At the end of our
sample, October 2009, we estimate gross leverage across hedge funds to be 1.5. Over the
whole sample, average gross leverage is 2.1. As expected from the fairly smooth transitions
in Fig. 4., gross leverage is very persistent with an autocorrelation of 0.97.
The patterns of gross leverage for all hedge funds are broadly reflected in the dynamics
of the leverage for hedge fund sectors, which are also highly persistent with correlations well
above 0.95. Leverage for event-driven and equity funds is lower, on average, at 1.3 and 1.6,
respectively, than for all hedge funds, which have an average gross leverage of 2.1 over the
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sample. Both the event-driven and equity sectors reach their highest peaks of gross leverage
in mid-2007 and gradually decrease their leverage over the financial crisis. Event-driven
leverage falls below one and reaches a low of 0.8 in December 2008 before rebounding.
Credit funds steadily increase their gross leverage from 1.5 at the beginning of 2005 to reach
a peak of 3.9 at June 2007. This decreases to 1.1 at the end of the sample.
Fig. 4. shows that the most pronounced fall in leverage is seen in the relative value
sector: relative value gross leverage reaches an early peak of 6.8 in April 2006 and starts to
cut back in early 2006. This is well before the beginning of the deterioration in subprime
mortgages in 2007. In December 2007, gross leverage in relative value funds falls to 4.5 and
decreases slightly until a sharp increase over April to June 2008 to reach a local high of 5.8
in June 2008. These periods coincide with increasing turbulence in financial markets after
the purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase in March 2008 and the illiquidity of many
securitized asset markets.14 The increasing leverage in early 2008 in relative value is not
due to any one fund; several large funds in the database exhibit this behavior and, in general,
the leverage of all relative value funds over the financial crisis is volatile. From June 2008
gross leverage of the relative value sector decreases from 5.8 to 2.3 at October 2009. Over
the whole sample, relative value gross leverage is 4.8.
5.1.2. Dispersion of Gross Leverage
While Fig. 4. shows the average hedge fund leverage, an open question is how the cross-
section of leverage changes over time. We address this in Fig. 5. which plots the median
and the cross-sectional interquartile range (25th and 75th percentiles) of gross leverage. The
cross-sectional distribution of all leverage measures does change, but is fairly stable across
14 Relative value strategies (e.g., capital structure arbitrage and convertible bond arbitrage) tend to be more
sensitive to the relative relation between securities and asset classes than credit, equity, and event-driven strate-
gies, which tend to be based more on single-security fundamentals. When markets showed signs of normalizing
after the Bear Stearns takeover in March 2008, many relative value strategies were quick to reapply leverage
to take advantage of the stabilized and converging valuations. This period of improved market conditions was
brief as new financial sector shocks occurred during the Summer of 2008, at which time relative value managers
quickly brought leverage down.
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the sample. Since there are some funds with very large leverage in our sample, the median
falls closer to the 25th percentile than to the 75th percentile for all the leverage ratios. During
2005 to early 2007, the interquartile range for gross hedge fund leverage stays in the range
1.0 to 1.3. During mid-2007, the interquartile cross-sectional dispersion increases to 1.6 in
May 2007 and then falls together with the overall decrease in leverage during this period.
Interestingly, the largest decline in leverage in 2008 during the financial crisis is not associ-
ated with any significant change in the cross-section of hedge fund leverage. In summary,
although hedge fund leverage is heterogeneous, the cross-sectional pattern of hedge fund
leverage is fairly stable and in particular, does not significantly change in 2008 when the
overall level of leverage is declining.
5.1.3. Gross vs. Net and Long-only Leverage
In Fig. 6. we plot gross, net, and long-only leverage across all hedge funds (top panel)
and for hedge fund sectors (bottom four panels). The lines for gross leverage are the same as
Fig. 4. and are drawn so we can compare net and long-only leverage. Fig. 6. shows that the
three leverage measures, for all hedge funds and within the hedge fund sectors, are highly
correlated and have the same broad trends. Table 3 reports correlations of the gross, net, and
long-only leverage and they are all high. In particular, gross, net, and long-only leverage all
have pairwise correlations above 0.92 in Panel A.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the correlations of gross, net, and long leverage for the hedge
fund sectors. If there are no independent active short bets, then the correlations of all lever-
age measures should be one. Thus, we can infer the extent of the separate management of
long and short positions by examining the correlations between gross and net leverage. The
correlation of net and gross leverage is lowest for equity hedge funds, at 0.49, and above
0.80 for the other hedge fund sectors. This is consistent with funds in the equity sector most
actively separately managing their long and short bets. In contrast, the highest correlation
between net and gross leverage is 0.88 for relative value funds, which indicates these funds
are most likely to take positions as long-short pairs.
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One difference between the leverage measures in Fig. 6. is that the net and long-only
leverage ratios are smoother than gross leverage. For all hedge funds the standard deviation
of gross leverage is 0.36, whereas the standard deviations for net and long leverage are 0.14
and 0.25, respectively. Thus, hedge funds manage the leverage associated with active long
and short positions in different ways. This pattern is also repeated in each of the hedge fund
sectors. The largest difference in the volatility of gross leverage compared to net leverage
is for relative value, where gross and net leverage standard deviations are 1.22 and 0.20,
respectively. The mean of net leverage for relative value is also much lower, at 0.82, than
the average level of gross leverage at 4.84. The low volatility of net leverage for relative
value funds is consistent with these funds maintaining balanced long-short positions where a
large number of their active bets consist of taking advantage of relative pricing differentials
between assets. The stable and low net leverage for relative value funds could also imply
that focusing on gross leverage overstates the market risk of this hedge fund sector.
An interesting episode for equity hedge funds is the temporary ban on shorting financial
stocks which was imposed in September 2008 and repealed one month later (see Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang, 2009, for details). Equity hedge fund leverage was already trending down-
wards prior to this period beginning in mid-2007 and there is no noticeable additional effect
in September or October 2008 for gross leverage or long-only leverage. However, Fig. 6.
shows there is a small downward dip in net leverage during these months with net leverage
being 0.48, 0.44, and 0.50 during the months of July, September, and October 2008, respec-
tively. Thus, this event seems to affect the short leverage positions of equity funds, but the
overall effect is small. This could be because the ban affected only the financial sector or
because these hedge funds were able to take offsetting trades in derivatives markets or other
non-financial firms to maintain their short positions.
Finally, we observe a high level of covariation for net and long-only leverage in Fig. 6.
across all hedge funds and within sectors. This is similar to the high degree of comovement of
gross leverage across sectors in Fig. 4.. We report correlations for all hedge funds and across
sectors for each leverage measure in Table 4. These cross correlations are high indicating
that each leverage measure generally rises and falls in tandem for each hedge fund sector.
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In particular, Panel A shows that although the relative value sector contains the smallest
number of funds, the correlation of gross leverage of relative value with all hedge funds is
0.93. The lowest correlation is between relative value and event driven, at 0.65. Put another
way, looking at gross leverage across all hedge funds is a good summary measure for what
is happening to gross leverage in the various hedge fund sectors. Panels B and C also show
that this is true for net and long-only leverage. Thus, sector-level variation in hedge fund
leverage is similar to the aggregate-level behavior of leverage across all hedge funds.
5.2. Macro Predictors of Hedge Fund Leverage
In this section, we discuss the ability of various macro and fund-specific variables to
predict hedge fund leverage. We first report estimates of the predictive model in Eq. (2)
taking only economy-wide variables and report the results in Table 5. We consider gross
leverage in Panel A, net leverage in Panel B, and long-only leverage in Panel C. In all re-
gressions we include lagged leverage as an independent variable. Regressions (1)–(8) add
each macro variable one at a time together with lagged leverage, while all variables jointly
enter regression (9). We use fund-level fixed effects in all regressions. In each panel, the
coefficients on lagged leverage are negative with very high posterior t-statistics. The lagged
leverage coefficients range from -0.20 to -0.31 indicating that hedge fund leverage is strongly
mean-reverting.
Panel A, which reports results for gross leverage, shows that all the macro variables, with
the exception of aggregate hedge fund flows, significantly predict changes in hedge fund
leverage when used in conjunction with past leverage. The largest coefficient in magnitude
is on investment bank CDS protection, where for a 1% increase in CDS spreads, next-month
hedge fund leverage shrinks by 11.5%, on average. As investment banks perform well (re-
gression (2)) or the S&P 500 posts higher returns (regression (3)), hedge fund leverage tends
to increase next month. We observe that when volatility increases, as measured by VIX
(regression (4)), or assets become riskier, as measured by the TED spread (regression (6)),
hedge fund leverage tends to decrease over the next month. This is consistent with hedge
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funds targeting a specific risk profile of their returns, where an increase in the riskiness of
the assets leads to a reduction in their exposure. In particular, a 1% movement in VIX pre-
dicts that gross leverage declines by 0.9% over the next month and a 1% increase in the TED
spread predicts gross leverage will fall over the next month by 15.2%.
In regression (5), the sign on LIBOR is unexpectedly positive. We might expect increases
in funding rates, of which LIBOR should be a large component, to decrease future leverage.
Instead, the coefficient on LIBOR is positive at 4.35. This is surprising given that Fig. 4.
shows that hedge fund leverage decreases before and during the financial crisis. However,
in the joint regression (9), the coefficient on LIBOR flips sign and is now negative at -
6.66. Thus, controlling for other variables, which are significantly correlated especially
over the 2007–2009 period, produces the expected negative relation between LIBOR and
future leverage changes. In fact, LIBOR, the TED spread, CDS spreads, and VIX are very
highly correlated, all around 90%, and capture common effects associated with the financial
crisis over the sample period. Thus, it is not surprising that the coefficient on VIX also
becomes insignificant in the joint regression (9). In contrast, the term spread coefficients are
consistently negative as expected, which implies that higher expected funding costs reduce
leverage next period.
In regression (9), where we take all macro variables together, the predictors of hedge fund
leverage which have posterior t-statistics greater than two in absolute value are investment
bank CDS spreads, the lagged S&P 500 return, LIBOR, and the term spread. Increases in
current funding costs, as measured by CDS spreads and LIBOR predict decreases in leverage,
as do increases in future expected funding costs, as measured by the term spread.
In Panels B and C of Table 5, we report estimates of the same regressions for net and
long-only leverage. In Panel B, all the coefficients on the macro variables are significant in
the bivariate regressions (1)–(8), with the same signs as Panel A for gross leverage but with
smaller magnitudes. However, there are no significant macro predictors of net leverage in the
joint regression (9). Thus, overall net leverage is mostly determined only by its lagged value.
Said differently, the only significant distinguishing feature of net leverage predictability is
that it is highly mean-reverting. In Panel C, long-only leverage is significantly predicted by
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each individual macro variable in regressions (1)–(8) with the same signs as gross leverage
in Panel A. The last column in Panel C for regression (9) reports that increases in the cost of
investment bank CDS protection and the term spread significantly lower future long leverage.
This indicates that most of the predictability in gross leverage by macro determinants in Panel
A is coming from the predictability of long-only leverage by macro variables.
5.3. Fund-specific Predictors of Hedge Fund Leverage
In Table 6 we examine the ability of fund-specific variables to predict hedge fund lever-
age. All the regressions in Table 6 include the macro predictors used in Table 5 which are
not reported as they have the same signs, same significance levels, and approximately the
same magnitudes, as the coefficients reported in the macro-only regressions of Table 5.
The main surprising result of Table 6 is that, with one exception, all of the fund-specific
variables have insignificant coefficients. This is for both the case of the bivariate regressions
(1)–(4), where the fund-specific variables are used together with past leverage, and in the
case of the joint regression (5). This occurs for all three measures of leverage in Panels A-C.
Moreover, the adjusted R2s of the macro-only specifications in Table 5 are almost identi-
cal to their counterparts in the fund-specific variable specifications in Table 6. This finding
suggests that hedge funds exhibit a high degree of similarity in their leverage exposures that
depends largely only on the aggregate state of the economy. Said differently, predictable
changes in hedge fund leverage are mostly systematic and there are few fund-level idiosyn-
cratic effects.15
The only fund-specific variable that has a posterior t-statistic larger than two is hedge
fund return volatility. In Panel A for gross leverage, this variable has a coefficient of -1.41
in the joint regression (5) with a posterior t-statistic of -2.11. The bivariate regression (2)
also has a similar coefficient on fund-specific volatility of -1.34 with a posterior t-statistic of -
15 Our filters remove young hedge funds which tend to be smaller and tend to have higher funding costs.
Thus, our data filters could account for the lack of a relation between AUM and hedge fund leverage. The lack
of a relation between past flows and leverage can be due to notice period, lockups, and gates restrictions (see,
for example, Ang and Bollen, 2010), which give managers advance notice of flows before they actually occur.
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1.93. In the deleveraging cycles of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and others, fund return
volatility affects margins and since margins correspond to limits in leverage, increases in
fund return volatility should lead to lower leverage levels of hedge funds. Thus, our findings
confirm the prediction of Brunnemeier and Pedersen of a significantly negative coefficient
on return volatility. This is essentially the only significant fund-specific effect and it occurs
only for gross leverage.
5.4. Contemporaneous Relations with Hedge Fund Leverage
We now investigate the contemporaneous relations of gross leverage in the model in Eq.
(3) with macro and fund-specific variables. Table 7 reports the regression coefficients of
the contemporaneous model (3) and compares them with the predictive model (2), which
are identical to regression (9) of Table 5 for the macro-only predictors and regression (5) of
Table 6 for the fund-specific predictors.
The contemporaneous model has significantly lower adjusted R2s than the predictive
model, at 0.08 vs. 0.13 for the macro-only system and 0.09 vs. 0.13 for the fund-specific
variable system. Thus, the fit of the contemporaneous model without lagged leverage is
worse than the predictive system with lagged leverage. Hence, the lagged leverage coeffi-
cient is an extremely important predictor. The contemporaneous model does have signifi-
cantly autocorrelated error terms, with estimates of φǫ of 0.25 and 0.55 for the macro-only
and fund-specific variable cases, respectively. As a specification check, we compute the au-
tocorrelation of error terms in the predictive specification. This turns out to be 0.03. Thus,
absorbing the persistence of leverage by past leverage on the right-hand side (RHS) absorbs
most of the serial correlation effects—when lagged leverage is included as a regressor, there
seems to be little gained by making the error terms autocorrelated.
Table 7 shows two major differences in sign between the predictive model coefficients
and the contemporaneous determinants of leverage in the macro-only specification. First, the
coefficient on the S&P 500 return is positive at 0.67 in the predictive model and negative at
-0.94 in the contemporaneous model. As the stock market increases, leverage contempora-
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neously decreases—by definition, as asset values increase. But, higher stock returns in the
past forecast that hedge fund leverage will increase in the future.
Second, the coefficient on LIBOR is contemporaneously positive, at 3.44, but insignifi-
cant, in the contemporaneous model compared to a significantly negative coefficient of -6.66
in the predictive model. We expect the coefficient to be negative, which it is in the predictive
regression. The unexpected positive sign in the contemporaneous model could be due to lack
of power or the fact that true funding costs could have much shorter duration and be more
variable than LIBOR. The LIBOR interest rate is, of course, a valid predictor even though it
could be an inferior instrument to proxy for leverage costs in a contemporaneous model.
The coefficient on VIX and on aggregate hedge fund flows have the same sign in the
predictive and contemporaneous systems, but while their effects are statistically insignificant
in predicting hedge fund leverage, they are significantly contemporaneously correlated. In
the contemporaneous model, VIX has a coefficient of -1.43 with a posterior t-statistic of -
4.79. When VIX increases, it is well-known that asset prices fall (the leverage effect), which
accounts for the negative contemporaneous coefficient. This finding is also consistent with
the prediction of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), among others, where leverage decreases
during times of high volatility. It is also consistent with hedge funds increasing (decreasing)
leverage during less (more) volatile times to achieve a desired target level of volatility. As
a predictor, the forecasting ability of VIX for future leverage is largely subsumed by lagged
leverage as a regressor. The finding that aggregate hedge fund flows are contemporaneously
correlated with hedge fund leverage goes against Stein (2009), who predicts that the entry of
new capital should decrease the leverage of arbitrageurs.
The last two columns of Table 7 report coefficients for fund-specific variables for the
predictive and contemporaneous systems, where both estimations control for the macro vari-
ables. The results are similar. The only significant variable in both cases is the fund’s rolling
12-month volatility of returns. The effect, however, is much stronger contemporaneously
(with a coefficient of -4.35 and a posterior t-statistic of -2.35) compared to the predictive
model (with a coefficient of -1.41 with a posterior t-statistic of -2.11). While the negative
forecasting ability of fund-specific volatility for future leverage is consistent with delever-
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aging cycle models, the contemporaneous relation is even stronger. Like the effect of VIX,
this can be a reflection of the leverage effect, but it is also consistent with hedge funds using
leverage to target a desired level of volatility.
5.5. Hedge Fund Leverage vs. Finance Sector Leverage
In this section we compare hedge fund leverage to the leverage of listed financial com-
panies. We focus on aggregate gross hedge fund leverage, but our previous results show
that the net and long-only leverage ratios exhibit similar patterns both for all hedge funds
and within hedge fund sectors. We define the leverage of listed firms as the value of total
assets divided by market value, that is, we study market leverage. Other authors studying
the leverage of financial institutions like Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010), among others, use
book leverage rather than market leverage. We use market leverage because the market eq-
uity value is closest to the NAV of a hedge fund (see Appendix A). We compare hedge fund
leverage to the leverage of banks, investment banks, and the entire finance sector, which we
describe in more detail in Appendix B.16
Fig. 7. plots the average level of gross hedge fund leverage in the solid line using the
left-hand scale and plots the leverage of the financial sectors in various dashed lines on the
right-hand scale. The level of gross hedge fund leverage is the same as in Fig. 4. and starts to
decline in mid-2007. Gross hedge fund leverage is modest, between 1.5 and 2.5, compared to
the leverage of listed financial firms: the average leverage of investment banks and the whole
finance sector over our sample are 14.2 and 9.4, respectively. Fig. 7. shows that leverage
in each of the banking and investment banking subsectors and the whole finance sector are
highly correlated. Finance sector leverage starts to rise when hedge fund leverage starts to
fall in 2007, continues to rise in 2008, and then shoots up in early 2009 before reverting back
to more normal levels in late 2009. This counter-cyclical behavior of financial leverage,
16 He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) contrast the behavior of commercial and investment bank leverage
and show they are different. However, many investment banks were either acquired or became commercial
banks during the financial crisis. Since our focus is on hedge fund leverage, we choose to contrast hedge fund
leverage with the leverage of all of these institutions.
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where market leverage increases during bad times, is consistent with the model of He and
Krishnamurthy (2009).17
The remarkable takeaway of Fig. 7. is that hedge fund leverage is counter-cyclical to the
market leverage of financial intermediaries. As hedge fund leverage declines in 2007 and
continues to fall over the financial crisis in 2008 and early 2009, the leverage of financial
institutions continues to inexorably rise. The highest level of gross hedge fund leverage
is 2.6 at June 2007, well before the worst periods of the financial crisis. In contrast, the
leverage of investment banks is 10.4 at June 2007 and severely spikes upward to reach a
peak of 40.7 in February 2009. During this month, the U.S. Treasury takes equity positions
in all of the major U.S. banks. In contrast, hedge fund leverage is very modest at 1.4 at that
time. Note that hedge fund leverage started to decline at least six months before the financial
crisis began in 2008.
We show the counter-cyclical behavior of hedge fund leverage to finance sector leverage
more completely in Table 8. We report correlation matrices of gross, net, and long-only
hedge fund leverage in Panels A-C, respectively, with banks, investment banks, and the
finance sector. These correlations are very negative. For example, the correlations of gross
leverage for all hedge funds with the finance sector are -0.88, -0.82, and -0.88 for banks,
investment banks, and the finance sector, respectively. The correlations are very similar for
each listed finance sector. The correlations between financial firms and hedge funds are
also highly negative for each hedge fund strategy. Clearly, hedge fund leverage moves in
the opposite way during the financial crisis to the leverage of regulated and listed financial
intermediaries.
There are at least two explanations for the counter-cyclical behavior of hedge fund lever-
age with respect to listed financial intermediary leverage. First, hedge funds voluntarily re-
duced leverage much earlier than banks as part of their regular investment process of search-
17 Other authors like Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010), and Shleifer and Vishny
(2010) emphasize the pro-cyclicality of leverage. Many of these authors focus on accounting or book leverage
rather than market leverage. Market leverage increases to very high levels during the financial crisis because
stock prices of financial institutions are very low at this time.
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ing for trades with excess profitability and funding them. An alternative explanation is that
the reduction of hedge fund leverage was involuntary. Hedge funds often obtain their lever-
age through prime brokers which are attached to investment banks and other financial firms.
The change in hedge fund leverage could be caused by the suppliers of leverage to hedge
funds curtailing funding. Risk managers in the prime brokerage divisions of investment
banks could have been prescient in partially forecasting the turbulent periods in 2008 and
forced hedge funds to reduce leverage earlier. Only when times were very bad in late 2008
did investment banks adjust their own balance sheet leverage. While this story cannot be re-
futed, the substantial lead time of six to eight months, shown clearly in Fig. 7., where hedge
funds reduced leverage before 2008 makes this unlikely. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence
through the Fund’s industry contacts suggests that prime brokers were not substantially in-
creasing funding costs in early to mid-2007.
5.6. Hedge Fund vs. Finance Sector Exposure
We last attempt to measure the dynamic total exposure of the hedge fund industry. We
do this by multiplying leverage by AUM to obtain an estimate of the total exposure. This
exercise is, of course, subject not only to the estimation error of our procedure, but also the
measurement error of total hedge fund AUM. Since hedge funds are not required to report,
the estimates of aggregated hedge fund AUM in the public databases are probably conserva-
tive. Thus, our estimated levels of hedge fund exposure have to be interpreted carefully.
Fig. 8. plots total hedge fund exposure by taking the estimated gross leverage across
hedge funds and aggregated hedge fund AUM reported from the Barclay Hedge database.
In the top panel, we plot hedge fund exposure in the solid line (left-hand scale) and hedge
fund AUM in the dashed-dot line (right-hand scale) in trillions of dollars. The correlation
between the two series is 0.83. Both AUM and exposure increase over 2006 and 2007 and
start falling after June 2008. The total hedge fund exposure starts the sample in January 2005
at $2.5 trillion, steadily increases, and then drops from a peak of $4.9 trillion in June 2008
to a low of $1.7 trillion in March 2009. This decrease represents an overall drop of 65%
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from peak. The correlations of hedge fund AUM and total exposure with gross leverage are
only 0.08 and 0.61, respectively. Note that the decrease in hedge fund leverage from 2007 to
2009 is from around 2.3 to 1.5. Thus, hedge fund exposure is primarily driven by AUM and
the dramatic fall in total hedge fund exposure over the financial crisis is caused by investors
withdrawing capital from the hedge fund sector. While many studies emphasize the role of
leverage cycles, Fig. 8. highlights that inflows and outflows are important components of
determining total exposure for hedge funds.
The bottom panel of Fig. 8. plots the total exposure and market value for investment
banks for comparison. Exposure is defined as the total amount of assets held on the balance
sheet. Investment bank and hedge fund exposure have similar patterns in the top and bottom
panels of Fig. 8. and have a high correlation of 0.8. There is a sharp drop in investment bank
assets in March 2009 which is due to large writedowns in balance sheets during this quarter.
Total assets of investment banks decreased from $6.9 trillion in early 2008 to a low of $3.8
trillion in February 2009. Towards the end of the sample, assets rebounded to $5.2 trillion as
financial markets stabilized.
We graph the relative exposure of hedge funds to investment banks and the finance sector
in Fig. 9., which is measured as the ratio of hedge fund exposure to total assets for each of
the investment banks and finance sector. The ratio of hedge fund exposure to investment
banks (the finance sector) is approximately 65% (30%) until early 2008. Then, the events
of the financial crisis in 2008 cause hedge fund exposure to decline to 40% and 15% of the
total asset base of investment banks and the finance sector, respectively. Thus, total exposure
of hedge funds is modest compared with the exposure of listed financial intermediaries,
especially recently after the financial crisis, and it is modest even before the start of the
financial crisis in mid-2007.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first formal analysis of hedge fund lever-
age using actual leverage ratios. Our unique data set from a fund-of-hedge-funds provides
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us with both a time series of hedge fund leverage from December 2004 to October 2009,
which includes the worst periods of the financial crisis, and a cross-section to investigate the
determinants of the dynamics of hedge fund leverage. We uncover several interesting and
important results.
First, hedge fund leverage is fairly modest, especially compared with the listed leverage
of broker/dealers and investment banks. The average gross leverage (including long and short
positions) across all hedge funds is 2.1. While there are some funds with large leverage, well
above 30, most hedge funds have low leverage partly due to most hedge funds belonging
to the equity sector where leverage is low. Gross leverage for other hedge fund sectors like
relative value is higher, at 4.8, over the sample.
Second, hedge fund leverage is counter-cyclical to the market leverage of listed financial
intermediaries. In particular, hedge fund leverage decreases prior to the start of the financial
crisis in mid-2007, where the leverage of investment banks and the finance sector continues
to increase. At the worst periods of the financial crisis in late 2008, hedge fund leverage
is at its lowest while the leverage of investment banks is at its highest. We find that the
dispersion of hedge fund leverage does not markedly change over the financial crisis and
that the leverage of each hedge fund sector moves in a similar pattern to aggregate hedge
fund leverage. However, we find that the total exposure of hedge funds is similar to the total
exposure of investment banks even though the behavior of leverage is different. The main
reason for this similar behavior is not the change in hedge fund leverage, but the withdrawal
of assets from the hedge fund industry during 2008.
Third, we find that the predictability of hedge fund leverage is mainly from economy-
wide, systematic variables. In particular, decreases in funding costs as measured by LIBOR,
interest rate spreads, and the cost of default protection on investment banks predict increases
in hedge fund leverage over the next month. Increases in asset prices measured by lagged
market returns also predict increases in hedge fund leverage. We find the only fund-specific
variable significantly predicting hedge fund leverage is return volatility, where increases in
fund return volatility tend to reduce leverage. There is little evidence that hedge fund lever-
age changes are predictable by hedge fund flows or assets under management. Contempo-
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raneously, hedge fund leverage decreases when VIX or fund-specific volatility increase and
hedge fund leverage is positively related to aggregate hedge fund flows.
An interesting direction for future work is to study hedge fund leverage and returns, since
in theory, when managers perceive better investment opportunities, they should increase
leverage. Thus, leverage levels can provide a crude measure of a hedge fund manager’s mar-
ket outlook. Existing empirical work finds little relation at an unconditional level between
leverage and returns at the stock level (see, e.g., Bhandari, 1988; Fama and French, 1992),
which could be due to not accounting for endogenous leverage and investment choices.
Hedge funds are a good laboratory to examine the relation between dynamic leverage man-
agement and returns because the underlying asset returns are more easily measured than the
asset returns of corporations.
34
Appendix A. Examples of hedge fund leverage
In order to illustrate how our definitions of leverage differ for various portfolios, we present several simple
examples of highly stylized hedge funds. In all our examples, we assume no fees are paid so the gross value of
the fund is the same as the net value of the fund. All the transactions are done instantaneously and we report
the overall balance sheet of the fund at the same date. For simplicity, assume there is only one share so the
NAV per share is the same as the AUM of the fund.
Example 1: Long-only fund
Consider a hedge fund that has just obtained $10 in cash from investors. The hedge fund manager pur-
chases securities worth $10. In addition, the hedge fund manager borrows $50 and invests those proceeds in a
$50 long securities position. The NAV of the hedge fund is the difference between the long and short positions,
which is $10, and is the same as the initial investment by investors. The balance sheet of the hedge fund after
these transactions can be represented by:
Long assets Short assets
$60 Long securities $50 Borrowed cash
$10 NAV
In this case, the hedge fund has $60 of Long securities and $0 of Short securities on its balance sheet. As a
result, gross leverage is 60/10 = 6, net leverage is 60/10 = 6, and long-only leverage is also 6. All these
leverage measures coincide because there are no risky asset short positions and the long positions are levered
by short cash positions.
Note that an unlevered long-only fund, which holds long asset positions between zero and one together
with cash, has positive leverage ratios less than one. All three leverage ratios—gross, net, and long-only—also
coincide. In comparison, a corporate finance definition of leverage where assets are the sum of debt and equity
would result in a zero leverage measure. This is because cash is counted as an asset on corporate balance sheets,
but in our leverage definitions, only risky assets are included in the leverage measures.
Example 2: Dedicated long-short fund
Suppose a fund with an initial cash endowment of $10 uses that cash to purchase a $10 long security
position. In addition, the fund places $50 in long-short bets in risky assets. The balance sheet of the fund is:
Long assets Short assets
$60 Long securities $50 Short securities
$10 NAV
In this case, gross leverage is (60 + 50)/10 = 11, net leverage is (60− 50)/10 = 1, and long-only leverage is
60/10 = 6. Now all three leverage measures are different because of the presence of the active short position.
In particular, the active short bet in this example induces the marked difference between gross and net leverage.
Example 3: General levered fund
Consider a fund with the following balance sheet:
Long assets Short assets
$20 Long securities $8 Short securities
$2 Borrowed cash
$10 NAV
In this example, the fund obtains leverage by both a short cash position as well as a short position in risky
assets. The gross leverage is (20 + 8)/10 = 2.8, net leverage is (20 − 8)/10 = 1.2, and long-only leverage
is 20/10 = 2. In this example, the long position is leveraged by both short security positions, which could be
active bets or passive hedges, and a short cash position. Note that whereas net leverage in Example 2 is equal
to one, the combination of short risky and cash positions causes net leverage to be different from one.
35
Example 4: Dedicated short fund
Our final example is a dedicated short fund. The fund starts with $10 cash, which it pledges as a col-
lateral to borrow $50 worth of assets. This represents a margin (haircut) of 20%. The proceeds from selling
the securities result in cash received by the fund. These positions represent $60 of cash on the asset side of the
balance sheet and $50 of short securities on the liability side of the fund’s balance sheet:
Long assets Short assets
$60 Long cash $50 Short securities
$10 NAV
In this case, the hedge fund has $0 of Long securities and $50 of Short securities on its balance sheet. Hence,
the fund’s gross leverage is (0 + 50)/10 = 50/10 = 5, the net leverage is (0 − 50)/10 = −50/10 = −5,
and the long-only leverage is 0/10 = 0. In the case when net leverage is negative, the fund is said to be net
short, otherwise it is said to be net long. Since the fund is taking only active short positions, the leverage on the
long-side of the balance sheet is zero.
In the case of a fund buying or selling derivative securities instead of transacting in the physical or cash
market, the previous examples hold if the derivatives are decomposed into underlying, but time-varying, po-
sitions in physical assets and risk-free securities at the reporting date. At a given time, once the derivatives
are decomposed into replicating positions in underlying securities, the same leverage calculations can be per-
formed.
Appendix B. Macro data sources
This appendix describes data sources of the macro variables and the construction of leverage for investment
banks, bank holding companies, and the financial sector.
B.1. Macro variables
The list of macro variables is:
Investment bank (IB) CDS protection. We take credit default swap (CDS) spreads on 10-year senior bonds
of the following institutions, with tickers in parentheses: Bear Stearns (BSC), Citigroup (C), Credit Suisse
(CS), Goldman Sachs (GS), HSBC (HBC), JP Morgan (JPM), Lehman Brothers (LEH), Merrill Lynch (MER),
and Morgan Stanley (MS). While several of these firms are mainly commercial banks with relatively small
investment banking and proprietary trading activities compared to other firms in the list, we take these firms as
representative of broker/dealer and investment banking activity. Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns ceased to be
independent entities in the sample and Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy. Data on CDS prices are obtained
from Bloomberg and market weights are taken from CRSP. The CDS contract is specified so that a buyer of
protection pays premiums specified in percentage points per annum of a notional contract amount to a seller of
protection. If the credit event (default) occurs, then the seller of protection has to deliver the underlying bond
to the buyer of protection. We take CDS on 10-year senior bonds of the listed financial institutions. We market
weight the CDS spreads using market capitalization data on common equity for those firms in existence at a
given point in time.
Investment bank (IB) returns. We take monthly total returns on the investment banks from CRSP. These are
market value weighted.
S&P 500 returns. This is the total return on the S&P 500 index taken from Standard & Poor’s Index Ser-
vices.
VIX. This is the monthly level of the VIX volatility index taken from Yahoo Finance.
LIBOR. We obtain the three-month LIBOR rate from Bloomberg.
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TED spread. The TED spread is the difference between the three-month LIBOR yield and the three-month
T-bill yield. We obtain the three-month T-bill rate from the St. Louis Fed.
Term spread. The term spread is defined to be the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the
three-month T-bill. These are obtained from the St. Louis Fed.
Aggregate hedge fund flows. This is the past three-month flow on the aggregate hedge fund industry, at a
monthly frequency, constructed from the Barclays Hedge fund database. This is computed following Section
3.2.2.
B.2. Financial sector leverage
We construct leverage for investment banks (BSC, C, CS, GS, HBC, JPM, LEH, MER, and MS), bank
holding companies, and the entire financial sector using CRSP and Compustat data. Bank holding companies
are defined as U.S.-based institutions with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which fall between
6000 and 6199. We define the financial sector as all U.S.-based companies with SIC codes between 6000 and
6299.




for firm i at time t, MVi,t is the company i’s market value obtained from CRSP as the product of number of
shares outstanding and the closing price at the end of the month t, and Ai,t is the total assets of the company
obtained from COMPUSTAT. The assets are reported quarterly and we use the most recent, observable quarterly
balance sheet report. Note that Ai,t/MVi,t is the market leverage of company i using the market value of
common stock as the value of equity.
Appendix C. Examples of reported hedge fund leverage
Hedge funds report their leverage to investors in several formats, often with several measures of leverage.
First, hedge funds periodically send their investors risk reports which list performance and risk statistics over
the last reporting period. Table A.1 provides an extract of a risk exposure report from an actual hedge fund.
This fund breaks down its exposure into different sectors and reports a gross leverage of 1.11, a net leverage of
0.22, and a long-only leverage of 0.66. This fund reports both long and short positions in each sector. These
numbers are received by the Fund every reporting period.
Second, some hedge funds report leverage information in investor letters. An extract of an actual letter is:
We made 5.3% on the short book and lost 3.3% on the long book. Having started the month
with 7% net long position, we were by mid-month slightly net short for the first time in the fund’s
history. Around mid-month we suspected that the market falls, triggered by subprime losses
in the financial system, were coming to an end and decided to rebuild a modest 18% net long
position, which is where we ended the month.
From the text of the investor letter, we observe that net leverage at the end of the month is 0.18, but gross
leverage and long-only leverage are not reported. However, the Fund is able to obtain more details on leverage,
and other risk and performance characteristics of each hedge fund than reported in the investor letters by having
analysts visit or call the funds to obtain further information. Thus, although the hedge fund officially does not
report size of long and short exposure at this month, our data set contains this information.
Appendix D. Estimation
This appendix describes the conditional distributions used in the Gibbs sampler. We treat the unobserved
data variables as additional parameters using data augmentation. A textbook exposition of these procedures is
Robert and Casella (1999).
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D.1. Predictive model
We rewrite the predictive model as:
Yi,t+1 = ci + β1 · Yi,t + β2 ·Xi,t + εi,t+1, (D.1)
where Yi,t is leverage of fund i at time t, the vector Xi,t includes both fund-specific variables and economy-
wide variables, and εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2) and is i.i.d. across funds and time. The constant terms, ci, captures
fund-fixed effects. We are especially interested in the predictive coefficients, β = (β1 β2).
We cast the model in Eq. (D.1) into a measurement equation:
Y ∗i,t+1 = Yi,t+1 + wi,t+1, (D.2)
where each observation error in {wi,t+1} is equal to zero if Yi,t+1 is observed and if Yi,t+1 is unobserved is
distributed as N(0, σ2w), where the measurement error is i.i.d. across funds and time and is orthogonal to εi,t+1.
This extreme form of measurement error follows Sinopoli et al. (2004) and others and effectively eliminates
observations which are observed from the set of measurement equations. This allows us to use a Kalman filter,
with extreme heteroskedasticity, in the estimation (see below). We denote
σ2v = σ
2 + σ2w,
which is the total variance for observations where leverage is not reported.
We denote the parameters θ = (β σ2 σ2v) and partition the data Y = {Yi,t} and X = {Xi,t} into observed
and unobserved sets, X = {XobsXunobs} and Y = {Y obs Y unobs}, where we denote the unobserved data
with “unobs” superscripts. The set of observed data we denote as Y = {Xobs Y obs}. We use θ− to denote the
set of parameters less the parameter currently being drawn.
The set of conditional distributions in the Gibbs sampler is:
p(β, ci|θ−,Y, X
unobs, Y unobs).
Conditional on Xunobs and Y unobs being observed, Eq. (D.1) is a regular OLS regression and we can use a
conjugate Normal draw. The dependent variable has two variances: if the regressor is observed in data the
residuals have variance σ2 and if the regressor is unobserved in data the residual variance is σ2v . Thus, we can
rewrite Eqs. (D.1) and (D.2) as
Y = Xβ + V, (D.3)
where Y = {Yi,t+1 − ci}, X = {Yi,tXi,t}, and V ∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ is a diagonal covariance matrix with
entries σ2 or σ2v depending on whether the regressor is observed in data or not.
We estimate the fixed effects in each iteration by appropriately demeaning both sides of Eq. (D.3). For
fund-fixed effects we subtract average values of the left-hand side and right-hand side variables for the obser-




We draw σ2 using a conjugate Inverse Gamma distribution given the regression (D.3) taking only the entries
where the residual variance is σ2. We can draw σ2v = σ2+σ2w by taking the entries where the residual variance
is σ2v . We ensure that σ2v > σ2 in each draw.
p(Y unobs|θ,Y, Xunobs)
We can interpret the system for Yi,t as a state equation (D.1) and a measurement equation (D.2). This allows
us to use a forward filtering backward sampling (FFBS) draw following Carter and Kohn (1994), except with
(extreme) heteroskedasticity and exogenous variables. For notational simplicity, we suppress dependence on
fund i below and use a FFBS draw separately on each fund i with missing values.
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We run the Kalman filter to determine the conditional distributions of the unobserved variables,
Yt|t−1 ∼ N(µt,t−1, Vt,t−1),
where Yt|t−1 is Yt conditional on the history of observations up to and including t − 1, which we denote as
Ht−1,








treating the Xt values as exogenous.

















Note that σ2w = 0 if Yt is observed. From the moments of a partitioned normal, we have
Yt|t = Yt|Y
∗
t , Ht−1 ∼ N(µt,t, Vt,t), (D.5)
where
µt,t = µt,t−1 +
Vt,t−1
Vt,t−1 + σ2w
(Y ∗t − µt,t−1),
and



















which is the stationary distribution for Yt assuming Xt is exogenous. We update as per a normal Kalman
filter to obtain the distribution yT |T and the smoothed conditional values yt|T . Once the Kalman filter is run
forwards, we backwards sample following Carter and Kohn (1994).
p(Xunobs|θ,Y, Y unobs)
We assume that the regressand variables, both observed and unobserved, are all jointly normally distributed
N(µ˜, Σ˜). To draw the unobserved variables for fund i at time t, Xunobsi,t , we have
Xunobsi,t |X
obs
i,t , θ,Y ∼ N(m, v
2), (D.6)





i,t ) ∼ N(µ˜, Σ˜)
has been partitioned into the observed and unobserved components. A similar procedure is used by Li, Sarkar,
and Wang (2003), except we recognize that Yi,t is endogenously persistent.
We update the values µ˜ and Σ˜ each iteration by a conjugate normal distribution and conjugate Wishart
draw, respectively.
We estimate with a burn-in period of 1,000 observations and 2,000 simulations. Convergence is extremely
fast. We report in the tables a posterior mean for each parameter and a posterior t-statistic which is the ratio of
the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation. This is to make inference comparable to a classical OLS
estimation, which cannot handle missing observations.
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where SSresidual denotes the residual sum of squares, while SStotal denotes the total sum of squares. For






i,t(Yi,t+1 − Y¯ )
2, where Y¯ is the average value of Yi,t and Yˆi,t+1 = ci+ β1 · Yi,t+ β2 ·Xi,t from
Eq. (D.1). We record the adjusted R2:
adjusted R2 = 1− (1−R2) n− k
n− p− k
, (D.8)
where the number of observations is n, the number of funds is k, and the number of explanatory variables is p.
In the tables, we report the posterior mean of the adjusted R2 statistic computed in each iteration.
D.2. Contemporaneous model
The estimation of the contemporaneous model in Eq. (3) is similar to the predictive model in Eq. (2),
except that we must now account for serial correlation in the error terms. The model is
Yi,t = β
′Xi,t + ǫi,t, (D.9)
where for simplicity we ignore the fund-fixed effects. Fund i’s idiosyncratic error term, ei,t, follows the AR(1)
process
ǫi,t = φǫǫi,t−1 + vi,t, (D.10)
where vi,t ∼ N(0, σ2). Similar to the predictive model, leverage may be unobserved at time t, so we employ
the measurement Eq. (D.2).
We follow Chib (1993) in recasting Eqs. (D.9) and (D.10) as a regular OLS equation by defining
Y˜i,t = Yi,t − φǫYi,t−1
X˜i,t = Xi,t − φǫXi,t−1. (D.11)
This allows us to write
Y˜i,t = ci + β
′X˜i,t + vi,t, (D.12)
which now has an i.i.d. error term. The corresponding measurement equation is
Y˜ ∗i,t = Y˜i,t + wi,t, (D.13)
where the observation error variance is σ2v = σ2 + σ2w where Y˜i,t is unobserved and σ2 if Y˜t is observed.
The set of conditional draws in the Gibbs sampler we use are:
p(β|θ−,Y, Y
unobs)
We draw β using a conjugate normal draw from the regression Eq. (D.12). There are two possible variances,
σ2 in the case Y˜i,t is observed and σ2v in the case it is unobserved.
p(φǫ|θ−,Y, Y
unobs)





We draw σ2v using a conjugate Inverse Gamma distribution from the regression Eq. (D.12). We ensure that
σ2v > σ
2 in each draw.
p(Y unobs|θ,Y)
Same as Section D.1.
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Investment grade corp bonds 5–10% 10–20
High yield bonds 10–15% 6.6–10
Convertible bonds 15–20% 5–6.6
Equities 5–50% 2–20
Commodity futures 10% 10
Financial futures 3% 33
Foreign exchange futures 2% 50
Options (equity) 75% 1.3
Interest rate swaps 1% 100
Foreign exchange swaps 1% 100
Total return swaps 10% 10
The table lists the margin requirements and their implied level of leverage in various security markets.
The data are obtained by collating information from prime brokers and derivatives exchanges as of March 2010.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of data
Panel A: Number of observations
Strategy Observations Funds
Relative value (RV) 1414 36
Credit (CR) 875 21
Event-driven (ED) 1408 37
Equity (EQ) 4439 114
Total hedge funds 8136 208
Panel B: Fund-specific variables
Standard Auto-
Mean deviation correlation % Observed
Observed gross leverage 2.130 0.616 0.680 82.0%
Observed net leverage 0.587 0.278 0.595 82.0%
Observed long-only leverage 1.360 0.382 0.690 82.1%
Past 1-month returns 0.003 0.031 0.241 100.0%
Past 12-month volatility 0.026 0.010 0.828 69.6%
Past 3-month flows 0.022 0.226 0.620 77.4%
Log AUM 8.528 0.143 0.883 85.0%
Panel A lists the number of observations and number of hedge funds broken down by strategy. Panel B
reports summary statistics for the hedge fund variables across all funds. We report means, standard deviation,
and autocorrelation of the monthly frequency variables. The means and standard deviation are computed using
the full observed data while the autocorrelations are computed only using observations with adjacent months
for each fund. We compute the variables for each fund and then report the average across funds for each
variable. Hedge fund flows are computed using assets under management (AUM) and fund returns over the
past three months following Eq. (1). The last column reports the percentage of observations that are observed
in the data set. The data sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table 3: Correlations of gross, net, and long-only leverage
Gross Net Long-only Gross Net Long-only
Panel A: All hedge funds
Gross 1.000
Net 0.927 1.000
Long-only 0.994 0.962 1.000
Panel B: Hedge fund sectors
Relative value Equity
Gross 1.000 1.000
Net 0.876 1.000 0.490 1.000
Long-only 0.997 0.910 1.000 0.955 0.725 1.000
Event-driven Credit
Gross 1.000 1.000
Net 0.835 1.000 0.805 1.000
Long-only 0.974 0.938 1.000 0.981 0.904 1.000
The table reports correlations of the posterior means of gross, net, and long-only leverage for all hedge
funds and for hedge fund sectors at a monthly frequency. Gross leverage is a sum of long and short exposures
as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage is a difference of long and short exposures
as a portion of AUM. Long-only leverage is the long exposure as a portion of AUM. The hedge fund leverage
ratios consist of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved
following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific variables
and fund-fixed effects. The data sample contains 8136 monthly observations that cover 208 hedge funds during
a period from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table 4: Cross-correlations of hedge fund leverage within sectors
Hedge fund strategies
All hedge
funds (HF) RV EQ ED CR
Panel A: Gross leverage
All hedge funds (HF) 1.000
Relative value (RV) 0.930 1.000
Equity (EQ) 0.761 0.557 1.000
Event-driven (ED) 0.846 0.650 0.899 1.000
Credit (CR) 0.836 0.738 0.853 0.786 1.000
Panel B: Net leverage
All hedge funds (HF) 1.000
Relative value (RV) 0.780 1.000
Equity (EQ) 0.932 0.695 1.000
Event-driven (ED) 0.963 0.657 0.857 1.000
Credit (CR) 0.921 0.578 0.854 0.879 1.000
Panel C: Long-only leverage
All hedge funds (HF) 1.000
Relative value (RV) 0.923 1.000
Equity (EQ) 0.866 0.683 1.000
Event-driven (ED) 0.915 0.736 0.920 1.000
Credit (CR) 0.877 0.751 0.917 0.857 1.000
The table reports correlations of the posterior means of leverage of hedge funds (HF) and average leverage
of their specific strategies (RV, EQ, ED, CR) for each of the definitions of hedge fund leverage: Gross leverage
(Panel A), Net leverage (Panel B), and Long-only leverage (Panel C) separately at a monthly frequency. Gross
leverage is a sum of long and short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage
is a difference of long and short exposures as a portion of AUM. Long-only leverage is the long exposure as
a portion of AUM. The hedge fund leverage ratios consist of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated
hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in
Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific variables and fund-fixed effects. The data sample contains 8136
monthly observations that cover 208 hedge funds during a period from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table 5: Macro predictors of hedge fund leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Gross leverage
Past gross lev -0.2446 -0.2228 -0.2250 -0.2423 -0.2378 -0.2288 -0.2401 -0.2347 -0.2447
[-32.0] [-28.8] [-30.7] [-31.8] [-30.0] [-29.5] [-31.5] [-30.9] [-32.0]
IB CDS -11.49 -9.3278
[-12.4] [-3.54]
IB ret 0.5968 -0.0436
[6.11] [-0.26]






TED spread -15.19 7.5973
[-8.64] [1.90]
Term spread -6.8214 -10.32
[-9.54] [-2.80]
Agg HF flows 7.7129 0.0934
[1.15] [0.38]
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.118 0.121 0.129 0.120 0.122 0.123 0.120 0.131
Panel B: Net leverage
Past net lev -0.3114 -0.2931 -0.3003 -0.3013 -0.3053 -0.2965 -0.3036 -0.2959 -0.3052
[-3.48] [-3.75] [-3.31] [-4.22] [-3.61] [-3.49] [-3.90] [-3.86] [-3.82]
IB CDS -3.3967 -1.1898
[-3.69] [-1.04]
IB ret 0.2644 0.1340
[5.88] [1.83]






TED spread -4.5400 -0.7010
[-4.26] [-0.43]
Term spread -2.0531 0.5129
[-3.16] [0.34]
Agg HF flows 0.3295 -0.0668
[3.29] [-0.61]
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.150 0.151 0.155 0.151 0.149 0.153 0.149 0.156
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Table 5 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel C: Long-only leverage
Past long lev -0.2376 -0.2157 -0.2177 -0.2351 -0.2301 -0.2219 -0.2324 -0.2273 -0.2373
[-31.2] [-27.0] [-29.1] [-31.3] [-28.4] [-29.9] [-29.4] [-30.1] [-29.9]
IB CDS -6.9342 -4.9876
[-12.6] [-3.39]
IB ret 0.4228 0.0433
[6.77] [0.40]






TED spread -9.4262 3.2221
[-8.51] [1.31]
Term spread -4.0850 -4.6731
[-9.48] [-2.00]
Agg HF flows 0.6891 0.0152
[7.81] [0.10]
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.116 0.118 0.126 0.116 0.118 0.119 0.117 0.127
The table reports regression coefficients of Eq. (2) to predict changes in gross leverage (Panel A), net
leverage (Panel B), and long-only leverage (Panel C) over the next month. Gross leverage is a sum of long and
short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage is a difference of long and short
exposures as a portion of AUM. Long-only leverage is the long exposure as a portion of AUM. The first row
in each panel reports the coefficient on the lagged leverage variable and the other right-hand side variables are
all macro variables. Each column reports a different regression. “IB CDS” is the equity market-value weighted
cost of CDS protection on defaults on 10-year senior bonds of major investment banks (IB), “IB ret” is the return
on the market-value weighted portfolio of IB common stocks, “S&P 500 ret” is the monthly total return on the
S&P500 index, “Agg HF flows” is the past three-month flow on the aggregate hedge fund industry as reported
by Barclay Hedge. All variables are described in detail in Appendix B. The table reports posterior means of
coefficients and posterior means of t-statistics in square brackets below each coefficient. All estimations have
fund fixed effects. Appendix D contains details of the estimation, including the implementation of fixed effects
and the calculation of the adjusted R2. The data sample contains 8136 monthly observations that cover 208
hedge funds during a period from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table 6: Fund-specific predictors of hedge fund leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Gross leverage
Past gross lev -0.2443 -0.2452 -0.2445 -0.2451 -0.2455
[-30.3] [-30.5] [-30.5] [-30.1] [-31.1]
Past ret -0.1288 -0.2151
[-0.49] [-0.82]
12-Month vol -1.337 -1.4139
[-1.93] [-2.11]
3-Month flows -0.0053 -0.0024
[-0.21] [-0.10]
Log AUM -0.0325 -0.0414
[-1.13] [-1.43]
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131
Panel B: Net leverage
Past net lev -0.3107 -0.3066 -0.3106 -0.3089 -0.3098
[-3.69] [-3.99] [-3.59] [-3.71] [-3.62]
Past ret -0.2357 -0.2057
[-1.93] [-1.64]
12-Month vol 0.1615 0.0543
[0.51] [0.18]
3-Month flows 0.0142 0.0153
[1.35] [1.49]
Log AUM -0.0183 -0.0201
[-1.41] [-1.45]
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.157 0.157
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Table 6 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C: Long-only leverage
Past long lev -0.2371 -0.2372 -0.2373 -0.2381 -0.2375
[-30.4] [-32.1] [-31.1] [-29.9] [-30.6]
Past ret -0.1923 -0.2258
[-1.20] [-1.41]
12-Month vol -0.6278 -0.7289
[-1.60] [-1.76]
3-Month flows 0.0048 0.0045
[0.33] [0.31]
Log AUM -0.0236 -0.0284
[-1.38] [-1.60]
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127
The table reports regression coefficients of Eq. (2) to predict changes in gross leverage (Panel A), net
leverage (Panel B), and long-only leverage (Panel C) over the next month. Gross leverage is a sum of long and
short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage is a difference of long and short
exposures as a portion of AUM. Long-only leverage is the long exposure as a portion of AUM. The first row
in each panel reports the coefficient on the lagged leverage variable and the other right-hand side variables are
fund-specific and macro variables. Each column reports a different regression. “Past ret” is the fund’s return
in the past month, “12-Month vol” is the volatility of the hedge fund’s returns computed using monthly data
over the past 12 months, “3-Month flows” is the hedge fund flow over the past three months computed using
Eq. (1), and “Log AUM” is the logarithm of each hedge fund’s AUM. All the regression specifications also
control for the macro predictors used in Table 5: the cost of CDS protection on major investment banks, the
return on the market-value weighted portfolio of investment banks, the S&P 500 return, option VIX volatility,
LIBOR, the TED spread, the term spread, and aggregate hedge fund flows. All variables are described in detail
in Appendix B. The table reports posterior means of coefficients and posterior means of t-statistics in square
brackets below each coefficient. All estimations have fund-fixed effects. Appendix D contains details of the
estimation, including the implementation of fixed effects and the calculation of the adjusted R2. The data
sample contains 8136 monthly observations that cover 208 hedge funds during a period from December 2004
to October 2009.
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Table 7: Contemporaneous relations with gross hedge fund leverage
Predictive Contemporaneous Predictive Contemporaneous
Macro variables Fund-specific variables
Past leverage -0.2447 Past leverage -0.2455
[-32.0] [-31.1]
IB CDS -9.3278 -1.3666 Past ret -0.2151 -0.1123
[-3.54] [-0.38] [-0.82] [-0.35]
IB ret -0.0436 -0.2248 12-Month vol -1.4139 -4.3495
[-0.26] [-0.90] [-2.11] [-2.35]
S&P 500 ret 0.6750 -0.9419 3-Month flows -0.0024 -0.0530
[2.09] [-2.02] [-0.10] [-1.11]
VIX -0.1010 -1.4324 Log AUM -0.0414 0.2552
[-0.51] [-4.79] [-1.43] [1.75]
LIBOR -6.6629 3.4420
[-2.35] [0.76]
TED spread 7.5973 8.7629
[1.90] [1.49]
Term spread -10.32 -12.237
[-2.80] [-2.09]
Agg HF flows 0.0934 1.3419
[0.38] [3.13]
φǫ 0.2494 φǫ 0.5547
[32.9] [45.5]
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.080 Adjusted R2 0.131 0.086
The table reports regression coefficients for macro and fund-specific variables of the “Predictive” model
in Eq. (2) and the “Contemporaneous” model in Eq. (3) for gross hedge fund leverage. Gross leverage is a sum
of long and short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). The predictive model coefficients
are identical to regression (9) of Table 5 for the macro-only predictors and regression (5) of Table 6 for the
fund-specific predictors. The “Fund-specific variables” regressions control for the macro predictors listed in
the “Macro variables” regressions: “IB CDS” is the equity market-value weighted cost of CDS protection on
defaults on 10-year senior bonds of major investment banks (IB), “IB ret” is the return on the market-value
weighted portfolio of IB common stocks, “S&P 500 ret” is the monthly total return on the S&P 500 index,
“Agg HF flows” is the past three-month flow on the aggregate hedge fund industry as reported by Barclay
Hedge. For the fund-specific variables: “Past ret” is the fund’s return in the past month, “12-Month vol” is the
volatility of the hedge fund’s returns computed using monthly data over the past 12 months, “3-Month flows”
is the hedge fund flow over the past three months computed using Eq. (1), and “Log AUM” is the logarithm of
each hedge fund’s AUM. All variables are described in detail in Appendix B. The table reports posterior means
of coefficients and posterior means of t-statistics in square brackets below each coefficient. All estimations
have fund-fixed effects. Appendix D contains details of the estimation, including the implementation of fixed
effects and the calculation of the adjusted R2. The data sample contains 8136 monthly observations that cover
208 hedge funds during a period from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table 8: Correlations of hedge fund and finance sector leverage
Hedge fund strategies
All hedge
funds RV EQ ED CR
Panel A: Gross leverage
Banks -0.884 -0.820 -0.613 -0.774 -0.658
Investment banks -0.823 -0.734 -0.536 -0.733 -0.586
Finance sector -0.884 -0.812 -0.608 -0.776 -0.656
Panel B: Net leverage
Banks -0.873 -0.623 -0.740 -0.923 -0.772
Investment banks -0.845 -0.525 -0.766 -0.891 -0.765
Finance sector -0.884 -0.610 -0.764 -0.931 -0.789
Panel C: Long-only leverage
Banks -0.893 -0.801 -0.735 -0.867 -0.722
Investment banks -0.840 -0.712 -0.680 -0.828 -0.667
Finance sector -0.896 -0.791 -0.738 -0.872 -0.726
The table reports correlations of average levels of leverage of hedge funds (HF) and average leverage of
their specific strategies—relative value (RV), equity (EQ), event-driven (ED), and credit (CR)—with average
leverage of bank holding companies (banks), investment banks (Bear Stearns, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Gold-
man Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley), and the finance sector
separately for each definition of hedge fund leverage: Gross leverage (Panel A), Net leverage (Panel B), and
Long-only leverage (Panel C) at the monthly frequency. We compute the leverage of finance subsectors fol-
lowing Appendix B. The leverage of hedge funds consists of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated
hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Ap-
pendix D using all macro and fund-specific variables and fund-fixed effects. Gross leverage is a sum of long
and short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage is a difference of long and
short exposures as a portion of AUM. Long-only leverage is the long exposure as a portion of AUM. The data
sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Table A.1: A sample hedge fund risk exposure report
Gross leverage Net leverage Long market value/ Short market value/
Sector ratio (%) ratio (%) Equity (%) Equity (%)
Consumer discretionary 16.73 1.93 9.33 (7.40)
Consumer staples 9.08 5.16 7.12 (1.96)
Energy 7.84 (1.91) 2.97 (4.87)
Financials 4.20 (2.87) 0.66 (3.53)
Health care 5.01 2.17 3.59 (1.42)
Industrials 22.14 7.28 14.71 (7.43)
Information technology 26.05 5.41 15.73 (10.32)
Materials 1.31 0.46 0.89 (0.43)
Other assets 17.72 3.76 10.74 (6.98)
Telecommunication services 0.69 0.28 0.48 (0.21)
Total 110.78 21.68 66.23 (44.55)
This table shows a sample hedge fund risk exposure report. This fund reports exposures monthly broken
down by sector. The reported quantities are percentages of net asset value (NAV). Gross leverage is a sum of
long and short exposures as a portion of assets under management (AUM). Net leverage is a difference of long
and short exposures as a portion of AUM.
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Figure 1.: VIX and CDS protection.


















The market-value-weighted credit default swap (CDS) cost of protection for the investment banks (Bear
Stearns, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley) is shown in the solid line with the axis on the left-hand scale. We plot the VIX volatility
index in the dotted line with the axis on the right-hand scale. The data sample is from December 2004 to
October 2009 at a monthly frequency.
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Figure 2.: Rolling 12-month hedge fund volatilities.

























This figure compares volatilities of returns of different hedge fund strategies over the sample period. The
monthly volatility for each strategy is constructed as an average value of sample volatilities of returns over
the past 12 months for the hedge funds that belong to the strategy. The strategies are relative value (RV),
equity (EQ), event driven (ED), credit (CR), and the whole hedge fund sample is denoted HF. The data
sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 3.: Hedge fund volatilities vs. HFR volatilities.












25th percentile of volatility in HFR
Median volatility in HFR
75th percentile of volatility in HFR
Average volatility in the data sample
We plot 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values of 12-month rolling volatilities of returns of funds in the HFR
database and the average 12-month rolling volatility of returns of funds in the Fund’s database. The data
sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 4.: Hedge fund gross leverage.




















The figure plots hedge fund gross leverage for all hedge funds (HF) and hedge fund sectors. The sectors are
relative value (RV), equity (EQ), event driven (ED), and credit (CR). The leverage aggregates all observed
hedge fund leverage and estimated hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved following the estimation
method outlined in Appendix D. These estimates are obtained using the model in Eq. (2) using all macro and
fund-specific variables and fund-fixed effects. The data sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 5.: Cross-sectional dispersion of gross hedge fund leverage.







The figure plots the median (solid line) together with the 25th and 75th cross-sectional percentiles (dashed and
dashed-dot lines, respectively) of gross hedge fund leverage across all funds. The hedge fund leverage ratios
consist of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved
following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific
variables and fund-fixed effects. The data sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 6.: Gross, net, and long-only hedge fund leverage.











































The figure shows the dynamics of the posterior means of gross leverage (solid line), net leverage (dashed-dot
line), and long-only leverage (dashed line) for all hedge funds and for hedge fund sectors at the monthly
frequency. The hedge fund leverage ratios consist of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated hedge
fund leverage when these are unobserved following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Appendix
D using all macro and fund-specific variables and fund-fixed effects. The data sample is from December 2004
to October 2009.
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Figure 7.: Hedge fund and finance sector leverage.




















We compare average gross hedge fund leverage with the leverage of banks, investment banks, and the finance
sector. The left-hand axis corresponds to average gross hedge fund leverage and the right-hand axis corre-
sponds to the leverage of banks, investment banks, and the finance sector. The hedge fund leverage ratios
consist of all observed hedge fund leverage and estimated hedge fund leverage when these are unobserved
following Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific vari-
ables and fund-fixed effects. The finance sector leverage is constructing following the method described in
Appendix B. The data sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 8.: Hedge fund and investment bank gross exposure and leverage.
Hedge funds




































We graph the gross exposure and AUM of hedge funds in Panel A and the gross exposure and market value
of equity of investment banks (IB) in Panel B. For hedge funds, we take gross leverage across all hedge funds
which consists of observed gross leverage and estimated gross leverage when these are unobserved following
Eq. (2) and the estimation method outlined in Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific variables and
fund-fixed effects. The hedge fund exposure is computed by multiplying the gross leverage by the aggregated
AUM of hedge funds from the Barclays Hedge database. Investment bank exposure is the total amount of
assets held by investment banks. The left-hand axes in both panels correspond to AUM or equity. The market
value of investment banks is the value of common equity. Appendix B contains further details on these
variables. The right-hand axes correspond to gross exposure. The scale of both axes is in trillions of dollars.
The data sample is from December 2004 to October 2009.
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Figure 9.: Relative gross exposures of hedge funds to investment banks and the finance
sector.















Relative exposure of HF to IB assets
Relative exposure of HF to FS assets
We plot the ratio of gross exposure of hedge funds (HF) to investment banks (IB) and the finance sector (FS).
The gross exposure is computed by multiplying gross leverage and AUM in the case of hedge funds and is
total assets in the case of investment banks and the finance sector. For hedge funds, we take gross leverage
across all hedge funds which consists of observed gross leverage and estimated gross leverage when these
are unobserved following the estimation method outlined in Appendix D using all macro and fund-specific
variables and fund-fixed effects. The left-hand axis corresponds to the relative gross exposure of hedge funds
to the assets of investment banks, while the right-hand axis corresponds to the relative exposure of hedge
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1 Introduction
Hedge fund compensation contracts are one of the most complicated compensation contracts
in the money management industry. Hedge fund fees are among the highest fees relative to
the fees of other money managers. For example, mutual funds charge on average 1.7%
of Assets Under Management (AUM) per year,1 while hedge funds usually charge a 2%
management fee and an additional 20% performance fee, where the management fee is pro-
portional to the fund’s AUM and the performance fee is proportional to the fund’s net AUM
gain. Hedge fund investors became especially concerned with the higher fees in hedge fund
compensation contracts during the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009.2 Investors paid high fees
even during the period when hedge funds experienced large negative returns. Some of the
hedge funds did not have provisions that restrict payment of performance fees (high-water
mark or hurdle rate provisions) and they charged performance fees for periods when the fund
delivered a positive performance even when the fund’s long term performance was negative.
After the crisis, provisions that restrict payment of the performance fee became widespread.3
This paper studies hedge fund compensation contracts and their influence on the invest-
ment decisions of hedge fund managers. I formulate a model with a risk-averse investor and
a risk-neutral hedge fund manager. The manager has a trading strategy and he is allowed
to apply leverage in order to amplify hedge fund returns. The manager can rebalance the
fund’s portfolio continuously, while the fees for his service are charged at the end of each
time period (for example, a month, a quarter, or a year). In the model, I specify a hedge
fund compensation contract with management and performance fees that include high-water
mark and hurdle rate provisions. The model nests, as special cases, models with compen-
sation contracts that have only management fees, contracts that have performance fees with
only the high-water mark provision, and contracts that have performance fees with only the
hurdle rate provision.
1 See Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009).
2 See, for example, Karmin and Strasburg (2009).
3 According to HFR database 91.7% of hedge fund compensation contracts contained the high-water mark
provision and 13.1% of the contracts contained the hurdle rate provision in 2010.
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I find that the hedge fund compensation contracts induce risk-taking behavior in man-
agers in the sense that managers use the maximum leverage possible, which is exogenously
specified to be the inverse of a margin requirement. I find that there is a strong correlation
between the inverse of margin requirement for S&P 500 futures contract and average hedge
fund leverage. Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), this paper studies hedge
fund fees. I construct an equivalent management fee (EMF) in order to compare various
hedge fund compensation contracts. The EMF allows the comparison of complicated hedge
fund compensation contracts to simple mutual fund compensation contracts that deliver the
same utility for the manager. I find that the hedge fund compensation contract that charges a
2% per annum management fee and 20% performance fee without high-water mark or hurdle
rate provisions has an EMF equal to 6.45%, while the hedge fund compensation contract that
charges a 2% per annum management fee and 20% performance fee and includes an indexed
with respect to hurdle rate high-water mark provision has an EMF equal to 5.31%. Conse-
quently, the cost of the indexed high-water mark provision is equal to 1.14% management
fee. I also find that the hedge fund compensation contract that charges monthly a 2% per
annum management fee and a 20% performance fee with both high-water mark and hurdle
rate provisions has an EMF equal to 2.93%. Consequently, hedge fund managers dislike an
increase in the fee payment frequency more than they dislike the indexed high-water mark
provision, since an adoption of monthly frequency is equivalent to a sacrifice of a 2.38%
management fee.
In contrast to my model which predicts that hedge fund leverage is mostly determined by
its maximum possible value, there is no consensus in the academic literature on the corre-
lation between the performance fee and hedge fund leverage. Ackermann et al. (1999) and
Brown et al. (2001) report that the correlation between the performance fee and the fund’s
leverage is low, while Kouwenberg and Ziema (2007) report that it is high. Empirical results
on the hedge fund manager compensation have to be carefully interpreted due to the fact
that hedge funds do not have to report their compensation schemes. Additional assumptions
about the distribution of the high-water marks and the shares invested by managers in their
funds are needed in order to draw conclusions about managerial compensation. I find that
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since, independent of the level of the performance fee, the hedge fund manager chooses the
maximum leverage, the correlation between the performance fee and fund’s leverage should
be low.
Theoretical literature does not also agree on the correlation between hedge fund fees and
hedge fund leverage. Carpenter (2000) proposes that the option-like form of compensation
contract leads, in some cases, to very high levels of leverage, while in other cases it leads
to even more conservative levels than the one the manager would take if investing personal
money. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) suggest that the
risk neutral manager uses leverage conservatively.
The model formulated in this paper is related to the models considered in Hodder and
Jackwert (2007), Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012). Sim-
ilar to Panageas and Westerfield (2009) and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012), the hedge fund
manager has access to risk-free and risky assets and is allowed to continuously rebalance
the fund’s portfolio. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) conclude that the risk-neutral man-
ager does not place unbounded weights on the risky asset despite the convexity of the com-
pensation contract. Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) consider an expansion of Panageas and
Westerfield (2009) model and find that the manager behaves in a risk-averse way with the
risk aversion coefficient determined by a liquidation boundary. I use a suggestion proposed
by Hodder and Jackwert (2007) to consider a model where the hedge fund charges fees at
discrete time moments, which is also the way hedge funds levy fees in the real world. I show
that the presence of margin requirement is required in the model since otherwise the optimal
leverage level is unbounded. I consider possibilities of fund liquidation by the investor and
by the prime broker as suggested by Dai and Sundaresan (2010) and find no significant effect
on the managerial behavior.
Section 2 describes the hedge fund compensation contracts with fee calculations. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 estimates costs of the high-water mark and hurdle rate
provisions and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Hedge Fund Fees
Traditional hedge fund compensation contracts contain both management and performance
fees.
The management fee is a fee that is proportional to the total value of fund’s Assets Under
Management (AUM). The management fee is common in money management industry and
is the standard mutual fund fee. The management fee can be charged at the beginning or
at the end of each time period. In a multi-period model these two possibilities differ only
in payment of the first and the last fees. We consider a case where the management fee is
charged at the end of each period to make formulas simpler. Later it will become clear that
the timing of the management fee payment does not change the conclusions of the paper.
The performance fee is charged based on the performance of the fund during the period.
Payment of the performance fee is conditional on the net fund’s performance being positive
and on satisfaction of some additional constraints (e.g., high-water mark and hurdle rate
provisions) if they are present in the compensation contract. Terhune and Lorence (2005)
define the performance fee as a fee that is charged on “net value added”. “Net value added”
is the difference between “gross value added” and expenses that in general include legal,
accounting, trustee, administrative, marketing and sales, custodial, and general investment
management charges. “Gross value added” is the difference between the value of the current
fund’s AUM before fees and the value of the previous after-fee fund’s AUM. We consider
only management and performance fees in this paper, so the expenses subtracted from the
“gross value added” constitute only the management fee.
The high-water mark provision requires the fund to outperform the highest Net Asset
Value (NAV) in order for the investor to be charged the performance fee. The value of the
performance fee is proportional to the outperformance. The value of the high-water mark
can be indexed or not indexed depending on the contract specification. We consider a case
where the value of the high-water mark is indexed by the hurdle rate.4
4 We selected the indexed high-water mark case because it results in less complicated formulas, while the
differences between the outcomes in the indexed and not indexed cases are not economically significant. The
formulas in the case where the high-water mark is not indexed are more complex due to the fact that the hedge
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The hurdle rate provision states that the fund does not charge the performance fee when
the fund’s return is below some predetermined value called the hurdle rate (for example, this
can be some constant required rate of return, beginning of the period LIBOR, or a treasury
yield).
According to January 2010 HFR database 11.1% of hedge fund contracts include high-
water mark and hurdle rate provisions, 80.6% of the contracts include only the high-water
mark provision, 2.0% of the contracts include only the hurdle rate provision, and 6.3% of the
contracts do not include either the high-water mark or the hurdle rate provision.
In order to understand how high-water mark and hurdle rate provisions affect calcula-
tions of hedge fund fees consider the following example shown in Table 1. A money man-
ager decides to start a hedge fund at the end of 2006. He meets an investor and they sign
a compensation contract with a 2% management fee and a 20% performance fee payable
when a high-water mark is outperformed, which is indexed with respect to 4%. The investor
allocates $1,000,000 in the hedge fund at the end of 2006.
The hedge fund delivers a 20% gross return which results in a $1,200,000 value of the
fund at the end of 2007. The fees are now levied and the numbers in Table 1 state the
following series of fee calculations. At first the management fee is charged, which results
in a $24,000 management fee. The fund’s value becomes equal to $1,176,000 after payment
of the management fee. The value of the indexed high-water mark is equal to the initial
$1,000,000 indexed by 4% which is equal to $1,040,000. The fund’s value outperforms this
value by $136,000, so the manager gets a 0.2× $136, 000 = $27, 200 performance fee. The
total amount of the fees charged in 2007 is equal to $51,200. The ending value of the fund
is $1,148,800 at the end of 2007.
In the column labeled ’2008’, I detail the next series of calculations for 2008. The fund
delivers a -20% gross return. This shrinks the fund from $1,148,800 down to $919,040. In
fund can outperform the value of the high-water mark by delivering return that does not satisfy the hurdle rate
provision, so that the value of the high-water mark is updated but the performance fee is not paid. This is not
the case in the indexed high-water mark case since both provisions are automatically satisfied by outperforming
the value of the indexed high-water mark.
69
contrast, the indexed high-water mark value increases by 4% and is now $1,194,752. There-
fore, since the fund value is below this amount, the manager does not obtain the performance
fee. Only the management fee equal to 0.02× $919, 040 = $18, 381 is charged in 2008. The
ending value of the fund is $900,659 at the end of 2008.
In the final column of Table 1, the fund delivers a 50% gross return increasing the size of
the fund from $900,659 to $1,350,989 in 2009. The high-water mark is again indexed and
is now equal to $1,242,542. The performance fee is charged on the outperformance of this
value, which is equal to $81,427. The manager obtains 0.02 × $1, 350, 989 = $27, 020 in
management fees and 0.2× $81, 427 = $16, 285 in performance fees which results in a total
of $43,305 in fees charged in 2009. The ending value of the fund is $1,307,684 at the end of
2009.
The general case of the total amount of fees charged as a function of the fund’s AUM and
high-water mark is equal to
z(At, A(t−1)+, Ht−1) = fmAt + fp((1− fm)At − (1 + hr)Ht−1)
+
where At is the value of the AUM at time t before the fees are paid, A(t−1)+ is the value
of the AUM after the fees were paid at the end of the previous period, Ht−1 is the value
of the high-water mark after the fees were paid at the end of the previous period, fm is the
management fee, fp is the performance fee, hr is the hurdle rate which is also the rate of the
high-water mark indexation, and notation (x)+ denotes max{x, 0}. The total amount of the
fees charged is composed of the management fee that is equal to fmAt and the performance
fee that is equal to fp((1− fm)At − (1 + hr)Ht−1)+, where (1 − fm)At is the fund’s AUM
after payment of the management fee and (1+hr)Ht−1 is the value of the indexed high-water
mark.
In the previous example fm = 2%, fp = 20%, hr = 4%, H0 = A0+ = A0 =
$1, 000, 000, A1 = $1, 200, 00, z(A1, A0+, H0) = $51, 200, A1+ = $1, 148, 800, H1 =
$1, 148, 800, A2 = $919, 040, z(A2, A1+, H1) = $18, 381, A2+ = $900, 659, H2 = $1, 194, 752,
A3 = $1, 350, 989, z(A3, A2+, H2) = $43, 305, and A3+ = $1, 307, 684.
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3 Model Setup
We construct a model with a fund manager who is able to dynamically rebalance the fund’s
portfolio as, for example, in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Panageas and Wester-
field (2009), and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012). The fund manager charges fees at discrete
time moments. In Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Ross (2003), Panageas and Westerfield (2009),
and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) the fees are charged continuously. Payment of the fees at
discrete time moments makes an enormous difference because it significantly changes the
nature of the compensation options – instead of an infinite number of infinitesimal options in
the continuous case the manager has a finite (or countable) number of options of substantial
size. The payment of fees at discrete intervals is more realistic as in the real world fees are
charged at the end of each month, quarter, or year.
3.1 Model
The investor invests with the hedge fund at time t = 0. The hedge fund manager dynami-
cally rebalances the fund’s portfolio between a risky and a risk-free asset. The risky asset
represents the manager’s proprietary strategy. The investor is allowed to withdraw all the
capital from the hedge fund at the end of any investment period after the fees for the period
are paid. There is no reinvestment afterwards.
There is only one investor in this model who makes only one investment with the hedge
fund and therefore the fund’s AUM and NAV coincide. This allows to use the AUM instead
of the NAV in the high-water mark definition, which significantly simplifies the model.





The price of the risky asset evolves according to
dP1,t
P1,t
= µ dt+ σ dBt,
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where µ > r, σ > 0, and Bt is a standard Brownian motion. The risky asset can be inter-
preted not only as a particular security, but also as an unlevered trading strategy employed
by the fund.
At each time moment t, the manager specifies the leverage level pit applied to the risky
asset, which is effectively the weight of the risky asset of the portfolio. The weight of the
risk-free asset is equal to 1 − pit. We allow the manager the possibility to lever up the risky
asset, which corresponds to having pit > 1 or to short-sell the risky asset, which corresponds
to having pit < 0. Since µ > r the manager prefers to have pit ≥ 0 for all times t.
We assume an exogenous margin requirement m, which effectively limits the leverage
the fund manager can take. A margin is a requirement from an institution providing leverage
(a prime-broker or an exchange) to an institution (fund) obtaining leverage to post a portion
m of the market value of the security purchased to a margin account. Futures contracts
exchanges require agents to post specific dollar amounts for each contract to the margin
account, but following Dudley and Nimalendran (2011), this can be converted to a portion
of the value of the underlying securities. The portion m effectively provides the maximum
leverage the fund can take equal to 1
m
.5 For example, Regulation T(Reg T) in the US requires
agents to post at least 50% of the market value of equities bought or sold short to a margin
account, which corresponds to m = 0.5.
The fund’s AUM, At, at time t between moments when the fees are paid evolves accord-
ing to
dAt = Atpit(µ dt+ σ dBt) + (1− pit)Atr dt. (1)
At the moment the fees are paid the fund’s AUM decreases according to
At+ = At − z(At, A(t−1)+, Ht−1)
where At denotes the value of fund’s AUM at time t before fees and At+ denotes the value
5 There are two types of margins available: initial margin, which is the amount required to be posted to the
margin account when the position is opened and maintenance margin — the amount required to be maintained
on the margin account while the position is open. We consider only maintenance margin in this paper because
it limits the maximum leverage the fund can take over time, while the initial margin provides limitations only
at the moment of the trade.
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of fund’s AUM at time t after fees. z(At, A(t−1)+, Ht−1) denotes the amount of fees paid at
the moment t given the current and the previous after-fee AUM as well as the latest level of
the high-water mark Ht−1. The total value of fees z is given by
z(At, A(t−1)+, Ht−1) = fmAt + fp((1− fm)At − (1 + hr)Ht−1)
+. (2)
The value of the indexed high-water mark is updated according to
Ht = max{(1 + hr)Ht−1, (1 + hr)A(t−1)+, At+} = max{(1 + hr)Ht−1, At+}. (3)
where the value of the high-water mark is indexed by the hurdle rate hr. The performance
fee is paid if the fund’s AUM after the management fee is paid is higher than the value of the
indexed high-water mark (1 + hr)Ht−1.
The investor decides to continue with the investment in the hedge fund after payment
of the fees with probability Q(Ai+, A(i−1)+, Hi−1) that depends on the current and previous
values of the fund’s after-fee AUM and the previous value of the high-water mark. Note
that there is no need to include the current high watermark value because it is determined by
other included variables. A constant for Q corresponds to a constant disinvestment frequency
assumed in Panageas and Westerfield (2009). If the function Q is equal to 1 for all the values
above some boundary and it is equal to 0 for all the values below the boundary, then this
corresponds to a liquidation boundary considered in Hodder and Jackwert (2007).
The manager maximizes his utility function







βz(A1, A0+, H0) + β
2Q(A1+, A0+, H0)z(A2, A1+, H1)+
β3Q(A1+, A0+, H0)Q(A2+, A1+, H1)z(A3, A2+, H2) + . . .
] (4)
where pit denotes leverage strategy, m is the margin requirement, z denotes total fund fees,
At denotes fund’s AUM at time t, At+ denotes fund’s AUM after fees are paid at time t, Ht
denotes the value of the high-water mark at time t, Q denotes the continuation probability,
and β = 1
1+r
is the time discount factor.
Table 2 specifies parameter values in the model. The mean µ = 10% and the volatility
σ = 20% of the risky asset are assumed to match the parameters of S&P 500 index, which
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is one of the possible investment strategies. The risk-free rate r = 4% is matched to the
average US treasury rate. The time discount β = 0.96 is inversely related to the risk-free
rate and the margin m = 50% is specified to match the Reg T requirement.
3.2 Solution
The optimization problem (4) can be written in the following recursive form:











subject to (1), (2), and (3), where V (A(i−1)+, Hi−1) is the managerial utility, the AUM of
the fund at time i − 1 after fees are paid is equal to A(i−1)+, the value of the indexed high-
water mark is equal to Hi−1, and m is the margin requirement.6 Later I show that if the
margin requirement is dropped in the optimization problem (5) then the optimal leverage is
unbounded.
The function z defined by equation (2) represents the total hedge fund fee payment at
time t. This function is homogeneous of degree 1, that is
z(bA1, bA0+, bH) = bz(A1, A0+, H),
so


















Denote ω0 = A0+H0 and ωt =
At
H0
for t ∈ (0, 1]. Assuming the utility function V is also
homogeneous of degree 1, that is V (bA, bH) = bV (A,H),












Equation (5) can be rewritten as





















6 Note, that we can substitute index i in equation (5) and consider interval [0, 1] instead of the interval
[i− 1, i].
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Assuming that the probability that the investor continues to stay invested in the fund depends
only on the ratio of the after-fee AUM to the high-water mark, we obtain


























From equation (3) that defines the update of the indexed high-water mark value we have
H1 = max{(1 + hr)H0, A1+},
where































This allows me to rewrite equation (7) as

























where function z(ω1, ω0) satisfies
z (ω1, ω0) = fmω1 + fp((1− fm)ω1 − (1 + hr))
+. (9)
Note that the total value of the fees paid depends on ω0 through ω1 due to portfolio manage-
ment strategy that starts from the AUM to high-water mark ratio equal to ω0.
Appendix A provides an analytical solution of the system of equations (8) and (9) for the
case where the function Q is constant. The optimal leverage level is equal to 1
m
, which is the
maximum leverage allowed.
In order to solve the system of equations (8) and (9) in the general case, I discretize
the time period [0, 1] and the set of feasible leverage levels [0, m]. During each of the time
moments the manager has a finite set of options with different utility levels and the optimal
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leverage is the leverage which delivers the highest utility for the manager. After a number
of steps going from time t = 1 to time t = 0 we find the managerial utility at time 0+ after
fee payment. The utility after fees is used to find the optimal managerial decision before the
fees are paid. Time moment t = 0 is equivalent to time t = 1 and we start the process again
starting now from the utility obtained for t = 0. The procedure is repeated until the solution
obtained converges. The numerical procedure is explained in Appendix B.
3.3 Extension: Model Without Margins
In the previous section, I obtained that the margin requirements drive the hedge fund manager
behavior. This section investigates managerial behavior in case the margin requirements are
relaxed. In this case the only difference between this model and the model considered in
Panageas and Westerfield (2009) is the timing of fee payment. In Panageas and Westerfield
(2009) the fees are paid continuously in infinitesimal increments, while in this paper the
fund manager is paid at discrete time moments. This minor change produces a huge change
in optimal leverage.
Consider one possible managerial strategy. Assume the manager chooses a constant
leverage level pit = pi for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then from equation (1) we have











Therefore, the expected value of the AUM at time t = 1 prior to the payment of fees goes to
infinity as pi goes to infinity.
The dollar value of the management fee is equal to fmA1, so the expected value of the
management fee paid at time t = 1 is equal to fmA0+er+(µ−r)pi, which increases to infinity
as pi increases to infinity.
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The dollar value of the performance fee is equal to fp((1− fm)A1 − (1 + hr)H0)+. The
expected value of the performance fee satisfies
E[fp((1− fm)A1 − (1 + hr)H0)
+] ≥ fpE[(1− fm)A1 − (1 + hr)H0]
= fp((1− fm)E[A1]− (1 + hr)H0).
(13)
The right hand side of equation (13) goes to infinity as pi goes to infinity. Consequently, the
expected value of the performance fee goes to infinity as pi goes to infinity.
The reasoning used in inequality (13) with respect to the indexed high-water mark can
be used with respect to any level that needs to be outperformed in order for the manager to
obtain the performance fee. Therefore, the expected value of the performance based portion
of the managerial compensation goes to infinity as leverage pi increases to infinity provided
fp > 0 and 1− fm > 0.
All the fees the hedge fund charges across time are nonnegative, so the total expected
utility for the risk-neutral manager goes to infinity since the first fee already goes to infinity.
As a result, the manager cannot have an optimal strategy that has a bounded leverage level
and delivers a finite utility, since he can always choose a higher leverage level that provides
a higher utility than the given strategy.
Consider a case where the manager is restricted to rebalancing portfolio only at t = 1





+σξ + (1− pi)er),
so
E[A1] = A0(pie
µ + (1− pi)er) = A0(e
r + pi(eµ − er)).
E[A1] goes to infinity as leverage goes to infinity, since eµ − er > 0. Considering the man-
agement and the performance fees as before, we obtain that the expected value of each of
the fees goes to infinity as the leverage pi goes to infinity. This shows that the result that
the risk-neutral manager does not have an optimal bounded leverage does not depend on the
ability to continuously rebalance the fund’s portfolio.
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Therefore, unlike in the models where the fees are charged continuously we obtain that
when the fees are charged at discrete time moments the model needs some additional limi-
tations in order for the manager to use a limited leverage. For example, Panageas and West-
erfield (2009) find that a risk neutral manager who has a continuous flow of fees chooses a
limited leverage, while I find that a small change to their model where the continuous flow
of fees is substituted with payment of fees at discrete time moments, the optimal managerial
behavior changes. When the manager faces a continuous flow of fees, he has less incentive
to choose high leverage, since the closest payment option is infinitesimal, while a loss would
lead to a drop in value of all the future options that add up to a substantial sum. In a discrete
case, however, the closest option value is already substantial and infinitely high leverage
delivers infinitely high expected utility from this option alone, and therefore the manager
chooses to behave differently in this case.
There are a number of arguments for limitations on hedge fund leverage provided in
the academic literature: future career concerns, managerial investments in the fund, and
liquidation in the case of a poor performance. I consider these and other arguments in terms
of the model with the risk neutral hedge fund manager in Appendix C and find that they
do not lead to limitations on the optimal leverage level. If the hedge fund manager is risk
averse, he chooses a finite leverage, but this result comes from risk aversion rather than these
listed reasons. The question of an average risk aversion level of hedge fund managers is an
interesting one, but unfortunately, according to my knowledge, there is no empirical study
which reports it. There are many books about individual hedge fund manager stories, for
example, Richard (2010), who points out that if anything, at least some hedge fund manager
behavior is risk-seeking rather than risk-averse. Hedge fund flows are convex (see Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997 and Sirri and Tufano, 1998), and this also effectively results in risk-seeking
behavior because it increases utility gains from positive results and decreases utility losses
from negative results.
Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) propose that the presence of a liquidation boundary in-
duces limited leverage levels without an exogenous margin requirement. Dai and Sundaresan
(2010) provide two possible types of hedge fund liquidation that are relevant to the model:
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liquidation by the investor and liquidation by a prime broker. In a continuous fee payment
framework with a liquidation boundary, as in Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012), it is impossible
to distinguish between these two cases. Below I consider two extensions of the basic model
which allow me to study managerial behavior given each of the two possibilities separately.
3.4 Extension: Liquidation by the Investor
Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) consider a model with a continuous flow of fees and find that
a liquidation boundary set to the AUM to high-water mark ratio of 0.685 makes risk neutral
manager to behave in a risk-averse way. They also consider a case where the liquidation
boundary is set to the ratio equal to 0.5 and find similar results.
I consider an extension of the basic model where the investor sets a liquidation boundary
for the fund to AUM to high-water mark ratio of lb. I assume that liquidation by investor
can happen only after the moment the fees are paid, which is a requirement set in order so
the investor does not liquidate the fund before the first fees are paid. In reality there are
lockup and notification periods that restrict early withdrawal.7 In the terms of the model the
liquidation boundary is set as Q(ω) = 1 for the ratio of AUM to high-water mark ω that is
above lb and Q(ω) = 0 for ω that is below lb.
Figure 1 shows numerical solution of this problem in the case where the manager can
rebalance fund’s portfolio only at discrete time moments and lb = 0.5. Each of the separate
pictures corresponds to a different intermediate time moment from t = 0 to t = 1, where
I assume that the fund charges fees at the end of each year (at t = 1). The manager uses
maximum leverage 2 during the first half of the year, because even if the fund underperforms,
then there is still the second half of the year the manager can recoup losses. However, at the
levels of AUM close to the liquidation boundary he starts to lower leverage, since now the
probability to receive performance compensation is small, while there is a high probability
of liquidation in case of further losses. Closer to the end of the year manager tries to avoid
very costly liquidation by lowering leverage even more. However, if the fund is below the
7 See, for example, Ang and Bollen (2010).
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liquidation boundary then the manager uses all the available leverage in order to gamble for
survival, as in Hodder and Jackwert (2007). At the levels of the AUM significantly higher
than the liquidation boundary the manager uses all the available leverage since even using the
maximum leverage he has a very small probability of being liquidated. When this numerical
solution for discrete time is taken to the limit with respect to number of subperiods within a
year in order to solve the continuous time case, we find that only at the liquidation boundary
at the moment the fees are paid is the optimal leverage equal to zero while everywhere else
it is equal to the maximum allowed level. This is because the manager can always lower
leverage close to the boundary and avoid liquidation in the continuous time case.
3.5 Extension: Liquidation by the Prime Broker
Hodder and Jackwert (2007) consider a discrete time model with a risk averse manager and a
liquidation boundary given by an AUM to high-water mark ratio of 0.5. Liquidation in their
model can happen any time moment before the fees are paid, which is the same situation
as the liquidation by prime broker case in Dai and Sundaresan (2010). They derive that
managerial behavior depends not only on the AUM to high-water mark ration, but also on
the time until the fees are paid. Next I examine this case in the context of my model.
Consider now an extension of the main model where the prime broker continuously mon-
itors the hedge fund’s operations and liquidates the fund when the ratio of current AUM to
high-water mark falls below some predetermined value. This extension assumes that the
managerial value function is equal to 0 for ω below some liquidation boundary inside of the
[0, 1] time interval instead of just the fee payment moment.
Figure 2 shows a numerical solution of this extension. Each of the separate pictures
corresponds to a different intermediate time moment from t = 0 to t = 1, where I assume
that the fund charges fees at the end of each year (at t = 1). I find that if the manager is
allowed to rebalance the fund’s portfolio only at discrete time moments then he maintains
leverage close to 0 if the fund’s AUM is significantly close to the liquidation boundary in
order to preserve the fund. When the fund is liquidated the manager loses all future fees
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and therefore he tries to avoid liquidation. If the fund’s AUM is significantly above the
liquidation boundary, then the manager decides to use the maximum leverage, since he will
have time to reduce leverage and preserve the fund in case of negative performance, while in
a case of a positive performance he faces significant utility gains from the performance fees.
Figure 2 shows that if the fund’s AUM is lower than the fund’s high-water mark, then the
manager chooses a more conservative portfolio before the fee payment than at the beginning
of the year in order to preserve the fund’s AUM. The reason for this behavior is that even
using the maximum level of leverage, the probability to obtain performance fees is small,
while a drop in the AUM level may lead to a struggle for survival in the next term. This case
differs significantly from the case where liquidation is triggered by the investor, since there is
much less dependence on the particular time moment here, while the managerial behavior is
more conservative when the fund is close to liquidation boundary inside of the time interval.
For the same AUM to high-water mark ratio considered right after the moment the fees
are paid, the leverage is lower in the case of liquidation by prime broker than in the case
of liquidation by investor. For example, the AUM to the high-water mark ratio equal to
0.6 in the liquidation by investor case is already high enough for the fund manager who
chooses the maximum leverage 2, while in the liquidation by prime broker case the fund’s
leverage is close to 1. The difference disappears when I take the liquidation by prime broker
extension to the limit with respect to the number of intermediate time moments during [0, 1]
time interval. This corresponds to the continuous portfolio management case where for the
AUM to high-water mark ratio equal to the liquidation boundary the leverage is equal to
0 while everywhere else it is equal to the maximum allowed level. Consequently, in the
continuous portfolio management model formulation there is no difference in managerial
behavior between the cases of liquidation by the investor and liquidation by the prime broker.
3.6 Extension: Multiple Margin States
Consider an extension of the base model that instead of a constant margin requirement in-
cludes several possible margin states m1 < m2 < . . . < mk. The motivation for such
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extension comes from Dai and Sundaresan (2010) who report that the typical values of the
margin requirements changed significantly from April 2007 to August 2008, for example,
the margin requirements for AAA ABS CDO changed from 2-4% to 95%, the margin re-
quirements for high-yield bonds changed from 10-15% to 25-40%. In this case the hedge
fund may suddenly face much stricter margin requirements with significantly lower maxi-
mum level of leverage allowed. Since the hedge fund manager knows there is a possibility
of a forced deleveraging in the future with an associated cost, he may chose leverage lower
than the maximum allowed leverage.
There is no need to apply lower leverage than 1
mk
in the state of the world with margin
requirement mk, since the manager wishes maximum leverage in this state and the forced
deleveraging is impossible in this regime. Therefore, in the highest margin state (the lowest
maximum leverage state) the hedge fund manager chooses leverage equal to the maximum
possible leverage. In other states of the world the manager may decide not to have the
highest possible leverage because of the possibility of forced deleveraging. As a result, for
the margin levels lower than mk the manager chooses leverage that depends on the likelihood
of forced deleveraging and its timing and therefore the hedge fund leverage is less correlated
with the time-varying maximum leverage level than in the state with margin requirement mk.
3.7 Testable Implications
The main model and the multiple margin states extension produce two testable implications.
First, the hedge fund leverage is determined mostly by the maximum leverage level which is
equal to the inverse of margin requirement. In order to test this implication we use a proxy
for the maximum possible leverage equal to the inverse of Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) margin requirements for S&P 500 futures contracts from Dudley and Nimalendran
(2011). Figure 3 shows daily relative margin requirements constructed as a ratio of the
margin requirement in dollars and the market value of the underlying assets. I also use
average gross hedge fund leverage from Ang et al. (2011). Figure 4 shows both series from
December 2004 to June 2009. I find that sample correlation between the two series is equal
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to 0.914, while the sample correlation of changes in the average hedge fund leverage and
changes in the inverse of margin requirement is equal to 0.47. These high and significant
correlations support the conjecture that the maximum possible level of leverage significantly
correlates with hedge fund leverage.
The multiple margin states extension suggests that the correlation between the margin
requirement and the hedge fund leverage is higher in the state with the stricter margin re-
quirement. In order to test this hypothesis, I split the data into two periods: 2005-2006 and
2007-2008. During the first period the margin requirement is lower, at 0.05, and therefore
a lower correlation between the margin requirement and hedge fund leverage is expected.
During 2007-2008, the margin is higher, at 0.1, and a higher level of correlation between
the margin requirement and hedge fund leverage is expected. The sample correlation over
2005–2006 period is equal to 0.16, while the sample correlation over 2007-2008 period is
equal to 0.97, which confirms this prediction. The correlation between changes in the mar-
gin requirement and changes in hedge fund leverage during 2005-2006 is equal to−0.07 and
during 2007-2008 it is equal to 0.57, which shows that the correlation between changes in
the margin requirement and changes in hedge fund leverage is also higher during the periods
with the highest margin requirements.
4 Costs of the High-water Mark and the Hurdle Rate Pro-
visions
Comparing two otherwise identical compensation contracts one with a provision and the
other one without, it is clear that on the one hand presence of the provision lowers the fees
the manager collects at the moment, but it also increases the fund’s remaining AUM, which
increases future fees. Since the investor prefers to include provisions that limit payment of
the performance fees, it is interesting to determine if the manager dislikes them and to mea-
sure their utility cost. The question of costs of individual provisions became more important
in light of a recent regulatory debate on the levels of hedge fund fees and provisions included
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in the compensation contracts.8 In this section I study the impact of high-water mark and
hurdle rate provisions on managerial utility in terms of the model.
For simplicity I consider a baseline case where the investor withdraws his investment
from the hedge fund at the end of the time period with a fixed probability Q and stays
invested with probability 1−Q.
I introduce an equivalent management fee (EMF) in order to compare effects of differ-
ent fee provisions across contracts. The EMF is the value of the management fee such that
the hedge fund manager is indifferent between his current hedge fund contract and a mutual
fund contract that charges only a management fee equal to the EMF. Therefore, for each
hedge fund compensation contract, there is a corresponding mutual fund compensation con-
tract yields the same utility to the manager. Consequently, management and performance
fees from the hedge fund contract together with different provisions can be mapped to one
number, which allows simple comparisons across different contracts. This approach allows
me to find appropriate fee changes in case the manager or the investor wants to modify the
compensation contract by adding or subtracting one or both of the provisions.
A mutual fund that charges only the management fee is a partial case of the model con-
sidered in Section 3.3. Equation (8) can be rewritten as
V (ω0) = E [βz (ω1, ω0) + βQ(ω1 − z(ω1, ω0))V (1)] , (14)
where V (ω) = Cω and z(ω1, ω0) = fmω1. The optimal leverage level pi is equal to the









E [ω1] = ω0e
r+(µ−r)pi. (16)
Plugging equation (16) in equation (14) and canceling out ω0 I obtain
C = βfme
r+(µ−r)pi + βQ(1− fm)e
r+(µ−r)piC. (17)
8 See, for example, Karmin and Strasburg (2009).
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This allows to express the equivalent management fee in terms of the level of the managerial







Table 3 reports values of the EMF obtained using equation (18) for different specifi-
cations of the hedge fund compensation contracts. The hedge fund compensation contract
that pays annually a 2% management fee and a 20% performance fee has an EMF equal to
6.45%. Restriction of the fee payment by the high-water mark provision decreases the EMF
to 5.75%. If the payment of the performance fee is restricted by a 4% hurdle rate, then the
EMF decreases to 6.11%. If the hedge fund compensation contract contains both the high-
water mark and the hurdle rate provisions, then the EMF for this contract is equal to 5.31%.
The main result of these calculations is that the addition of the high-water mark provision
without indexation is equivalent to a 0.7% drop in EMF from 6.45% to 5.75%, the addition
of the 4% hurdle rate to a contract without the high-water mark provision is equivalent to a
0.34% drop in EMF from 6.45% to 6.11% and an addition of the indexed by 4% high-water
mark is equivalent to a 1.14% drop in EMF from 6.45% to 5.31%.
I also consider a possibility of change in the frequency of fee payments by increasing
the frequency from annual to quarterly or monthly. The values of the parameters used for
the quarterly and the monthly models are adjusted so that their annual compounded values
are equal to the values for the annual model, in particular, the probability to disinvest in the
first year in the monthly model coincides with the probability to disinvest in the first year in
the annual model. I find that the increase in the frequency of the fee payment is even more
detrimental for the hedge fund managers. A change in the frequency of the fee payments
from annual to quarterly leads to a drop in the EMF from 5.31% to 3.73%. A change in the
frequency of the fee payments from annual to monthly leads to an even more pronounced
drop in the EMF — from 5.31% to 2.93%. The results suggest that hedge fund managers




I consider a hedge fund model with a manager who can continuously rebalance while the fees
for his services are paid at discrete time moments. In this model, I consider management and
performance fees. Payment of the performance fees can be restricted by high-water mark
and/or hurdle rate provisions. The manager faces a margin requirement and a possibility of
liquidation in case of poor performance.
I find that if the model does not include the margin requirements then the risk-neutral
manager chooses to employ unbounded leverage. Exogenously imposed margin require-
ments limit the maximum allowed leverage level. The analysis with multiple states where
margins can differ suggests that the inverse of the margin requirement is a significant deter-
minant of the hedge fund leverage, since the manager chooses to use the maximum leverage
available in at least some states. I test this conjecture using CME S&P 500 futures mar-
gins data and average hedge fund leverage and find that the correlation between hedge fund
leverage and the inverse of the margin requirement over 2005-2008 is equal to 0.91. The
correlation between changes in hedge fund leverage and changes in the inverse of the margin
requirement is equal to 0.47.
I construct an equivalent management fee (EMF) — the management fee that the hedge
fund manager is indifferent between managing his hedge fund and managing a mutual fund
that charges only a management fee of EMF. I use this measure to compare different hedge
fund compensation contracts from the point of view of manager utility. I estimate that for
a standard 2% per annum management fee and 20% performance fee contract that has no
provisions restricting payment of the performance fees, an addition of the high-water mark
provision without indexation is equivalent to a 0.7% drop in EMF from 6.45% to 5.75%, an
addition of a 4% hurdle rate is equivalent to a 0.34% drop in EMF from 6.45% to 6.11%
and an addition of the indexed by 4% high-water mark is equivalent to a 1.14% drop in EMF
from 6.45% to 5.31%. I also find that an increase in the frequency of fee payments from
annual to quarterly or monthly costs more for the hedge fund manager than these provisions.
For example, a change in the frequency of fee payments from annual to monthly in a contract
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that has a 2% management fee and a 20% performance fee with an indexed by 4% high-water
mark provision leads to a drop in EMF from 5.31% to 2.93%.
Hedge fund compensation contracts constitute a very interesting and a fruitful topic for
the academic research. An interesting question for further study is the influence of different
economic variables on the terms of the hedge fund compensation contracts. For example, the
hurdle rate provision is not as popular in new contracts as it was before the financial crisis.
Agarwal, Naveen, and Naik (2009) report that during 1994 - 2002 61% of the hedge fund
compensation contracts had a hurdle rate provision, while according to HFR 2010 database
only 13.1% of hedge fund contracts now have a hurdle rate provision. The high-water mark
provision, however, became more popular. Agarwal, Naveen, and Naik (2009) report that
during 1994 - 2002, 80% of the hedge fund compensation contracts had the high-water mark
provision, while according to HFR 2010 database 91.7% of the current hedge fund compen-
sation contracts have the high-water mark provision.
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Appendix
A Analytical Solution of the Constant Q Case
In order to solve the system of equations (8) and (9) at first note that the compensation f(ω1, ω0) is a convex
function of ω1. Consider the total expected utility function V as a sum of the discounted future compensation
options. The future options are multiplied by the constant probability Q, so the future options add convex
functions under the expectation sign. Therefore, the total fees over time form a convex function.
Consider a leverage strategy pit that forms a step function, that is, it consists of intervals where the leverage
is constant. Consider one of these intervals [t1, t2]. If the leverage on this interval pi changes to 1m then the










When we consider two symmetric realizations of the standard normal variable ξ equal to η and −η, we see that
for leverage pi this results in ω11 = ω1e−σ
√
t2−t1piη and ω12 = ω1eσ
√
t2−t1piη, while for leverage 1
m
it results
in ω21 = ω1e−σ
√
t2−t1 1mη and ω22 = ω1eσ
√






t2−t1( 1m−pi)η, that is the smaller value is divided and the larger value is multiplied by the same
number. Due to the convexity of the sum of total fees paid, the sum of values in ω21 and ω22 is higher than the
sum in ω11 and ω12. Therefore, the manager prefers to change leverage pi on interval [t1, t2] to the maximum
level 1
m
. This is true for each of the intervals of the strategy and as the result, manager prefers to have leverage
equal to 1
m
at each point in time.
Consider some strategy pi∗t . It can be approximated by step function strategies that are all less preferable




be inferior to the strategy pi∗t and therefore the strategy pit = 1m provides the highest possible utility for the
hedge fund manager.
B Numerical Solution
The main restriction of the equation (5) is the hardwired upper bound on the leverage level 1
m
due to a margin
level m.9 The lower bound on the leverage level is zero, since for the negative weights there is the same
normal distribution around the mean, as for the positive weights, but the value of the mean return itself is
lower, therefore it is never optimal to have negative weights of the risky asset (assuming µ > r.
The optimization problem is solved on a set of feasible leverage levels pi ∈ [0, 1
m
]. Consider a grid of
different leverage levels i
mN
that spans the interval [0, 1
m
], where i = 0, 1, . . . , N and N is some integer
number.
The manager solves optimization problems at time moments j
T
, where j = 0, 1, . . . , T and T is the number





] the leverage level is constant. This assumption simplifies modeling since there is no violation of
margin requirements during the time intervals between the discrete moments where the manager decides on



































9 The need for this limitation is based on Section 3.3.
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where ξ is a standard normal variable.
There are several problems that arise from this approach, since the manager has to know the expected value
of the future utility function in order to solve the optimization problem (5). Therefore, at first we need to know
the values of the future utility function and then we need to be able to calculate the expected value of the future
utility for a normal probability density function.
I use Gauss-Hermite quadrature in order to approximate the value of the integral over the normal density














where for each number n we calculate the abscissas xi and their weights ωi. This poses a new problem, since
we need to know the values of the future utility function at each point and not only on some predetermined grid.
The future utility function is obviously increasing in the ratio of the AUM to the high-water mark, since given
the same value of the high-water mark, the higher values of the AUM result in higher fees for the manager.
I use a spline procedure to estimate values of the function between grid nodes. Since the utility function is
monotonous, we know that the error obtained using this estimation procedure is bounded.10
At the end of the time interval we add fees and the value of the utility function going forward, which is the
function obtained at the beginning of the time interval. This results in the following algorithm:
Step 0. Take random initial values of the utility function going forward for a specified grid of the assets under
management to the high-water mark ratio for the time grid node 0
T
.
Step 1. Calculate the value of the utility function at the time T
T
as a sum of the discounted fees obtained at
the end of the period and of the discounted utility function at the new assets to high-water mark ratio.
The utility function used is the utility function for the time grid node 0
T
. The value of the assets under
management is the after-fees assets under management and the high-water mark is the updated high-
water mark. If there is a probability to continue that may depend on the assets to high-water mark
ratio, then it’s an additional discounting multiplier used for the utility function going forward. This step
defines values of the utility function at the node T
T
.
Step 2. For the previous node j
T
of the time interval find the leverage level that maximizes the expected utility
function calculated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature using the expected utility obtained for the time grid
node j+1
T
. Assign the value of the utility function at the current point to this maximum value. Repeat
step 2 until the node 0
T
.
Step 3. If the values of the utility function at the node 0
T
converged, then stop. Otherwise go to Step 1.
C Other Arguments for Limited Leverage
The academic literature has provided a number of arguments for a more conservative use of leverage by hedge
fund manager. Some of these models consider risk-neutral hedge fund managers, while other models consider
risk averse managers. Here I test each of the presented arguments in light of the main model. There are two
10 Additionally we consider a method that allows to bound the values of the utility function and to improve
the lower and upper bounds in order to check our approximations. The errors come from estimation of values
between the nodes, but since the estimated function is increasing, the values in the neighbor nodes provide
upper and lower bounds for the values of the utility function between them. Therefore, instead of approximat-
ing values of integrals we may calculate the upper and lower bounds on these values. Using the estimation
procedure for highest values we obtain the upper bounds on the values of the utility function, while using the
lowest values we obtain the lower bounds. Increasing the density of the grid we improve estimations, which
decreases the gap between the upper and the lower bounds.
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main differences of the main model from the referenced models: my model accounts for both management and
performance fees as well as high-water mark and hurdle rate provisions and while the manager can rebalance
portfolio continuously, the fees for his service are paid at discrete moments.
C.1 Future career concerns
Brown et al. (2001), Panageas and Westerfield (2009) and Hodder and Jackwert (2007) among others argue
that the multi-period career concerns that arise from having a number of compensation options over the long
run lead to limitations on the risk taking by the fund manager.
As I showed in Section 3.3, the risk-neutral manager in the case when the fees are charged at discrete
time moments can achieve infinitely high utility from the first compensation option already. Since the other
options result in nonnegative utilities due to the fees being nonnegative, the manager’s total expected utility is
infinitely high and therefore there is no need to decrease leverage due to the presence of future options. Thus,
the multi-period career concerns by themselves do not make the risk-neutral manager to limit the leverage level.
C.2 Managerial investments in the fund
Kowenberg and Ziema (2007) suggest that a substantial (e.g. > 30%) stake in the fund reduces managerial risk
taking. This argument does not apply for the risk-neutral hedge fund manager. When the leverage increases
towards infinity the expected values of the management and the performance fees increase towards infinity. The
expected value of the personal investment with the fund also increases towards infinity. Therefore the manager
is prone to take unbounded leverage in this case.
C.3 Liquidation in case of a poor performance
The fund can be liquidated by the investor, that is the investor can withdraw the capital from the fund. Investors
can withdraw money from hedge only after a lengthy notification period (Ang and Bollen, 2010) which sig-
nificantly limits investors freedom to withdraw money. The model in Section 3 incorporates this in a form of
possibility to withdraw money only at the fee payment moments. Hodder and Jackwert (2007) suggest that if
the fund’s liquidation may be linked to the ratio of the fund’s AUM to the high-water mark level, that is if this
ratio drops below a predetermined level, then the investor disinvests from the fund. In the model formulated in
Section 3 this can be done by defining the probability of continuation with investment equal to 0 for the case
when the ratio of the fund’s AUM to the high-water mark drops below this threshold.
Considering that the dollar value of the performance fee goes to infinity when leverage goes to infinity and
it is payed out only in the case of outperformance of the high-water mark, it is obvious that by using levels of
leverage that go to infinity the manager obtains levels of utility that go to infinity. Therefore, the possibility of
liquidation by the investor in case of significant underperformance does not lead to limited leverage.
C.4 Different high-water mark levels for different investors
A similar argument to the argument regarding the future career concerns can be made in a case, where we
consider a number of investors with different values of the high-water marks. This results in a number of
different options for each time moment, but the expected gain from each of these options increases to infinity
for leverage level that increases towards infinity. Therefore the managerial utility increases towards infinity
and consequently the diversity of the investors in terms of their high-water marks does not make risk neutral
manager to apply bounded leverage.
C.5 Conditional probability of continuation with investment
An extension of the case where investor liquidates the hedge fund if the ratio of the fund’s AUM to the high-
water mark drops below some threshold is the case where the probability that investor will stay invested in the
hedge fund depends on the ratio of the fund’s AUM to the high-water mark level. However, the hedge fund
manager obtains the performance fee for the first period in case of outperformance of the high-water mark and
therefore the expected utility from the performance fee goes towards infinity when leverage goes to infinity.
Consequently, independent of the ability of the investor to decide if he wants to disinvest from the fund, the
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hedge fund manager can obtain infinitely high utility. As a result, the ability of investor to disinvest from the
fund does lead to limitations on leverage.
C.6 Margin requirements
Duffie et al. (2008) produce a policy implication that requires hedge funds to have a fixed level of maximum
leverage they can take. A policy that accomplishes this is already in place.
Margin (haircut) is a requirement from prime-brokers or exchanges for hedge fund managers to post a
particular portion m of the value of the assets that manager wants to buy or to short-sell to a margin account.
This results in a hardwired bound on leverage equal to 1
m
. Consequently the manager does not have a possibility
to get an infinitely high expected utility from the first fees and all the before mentioned reasons may matter
when there is a positive margin requirement.
C.7 Continuous monitoring with a possibility of liquidation
We can consider a model with a continuous monitor, presumably a prime-broker, who continuously monitors
the hedge fund’s performance. This monitor immediately liquidates the fund in caseAt drops below a particular
predetermined level. This case is considered in the Section 3.2. The main observation is that the presence of this
monitor matters in the discrete case, but in the continuous case the manager will always take unlimited leverage.
This is different from the constant optimal leverage solution of manager’s problem obtained in Merton (1969),
Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and Lan, Wang, and Yang (2012) that depends on the risky asset expected
return µ and its volatility σ.
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Table 1: Fee payment example
Initial Value 2007 2008 2009
Performance 20% -20% 50%
Fund Size Before Fees 1,200,000 919,040 1,350,989
Management Fee 2% 24,000 18,381 27,020
After Management Fee 1,176,000 900,659 1,323,969
Net Value Added 176,000 -248,141 423,310
High-water Mark 1,000,000 1,148,800 1,194,752
Indexed High-water Mark 4% 1,040,000 1,194,752 1,242,542
Outperformance 136,000 0 81,427
Performance Fee 20% 27,200 0 16,285
Total Fees 51,200 18,381 43,305
Investor 1,000,000 1,148,800 900,659 1,307,684
This table shows a fee payment example for a hedge fund that charges a 2% management fee and a 20%
performance fee. The high-water mark value is indexed by a 4% rate. The indexed high-water mark value
has to be outperformed in order for the fund to obtain the performance fee. The investor invests $1,000,000
at the end of 2006. This table reports an evolution of his investment and the fees paid over time.







This table reports the values of the parameters used in the numerical examples throughout the paper. Here µ
is the mean return of the risky strategy employed by the hedge fund, σ is the volatility of this risky strategy, r
is the risk-free rate, β is the time discount factor that is related to the risk-free rate, and m is the value of the




Table 3: Equivalent no-performance fee contracts
Frequency fm fp High-water mark Hurdle rate Equivalent Management Fee
Annual 2% 20% 0 0% 6.447%
Annual 2% 20% 1 0% 5.754%
Annual 2% 20% 0 4% 6.107%
Annual 2% 20% 1 4% 5.308%
Quarterly 2% 20% 1 4% 3.723%
Monthly 2% 20% 1 4% 2.926%
This table reports the values of the equivalent management fee for different specifications of the hedge fund
compensation contract. The equivalent management fee is equal to the management fee mf where the hedge
fund manager is indifferent between managing his hedge fund and managing a mutual fund that charges only
the management fee mf . fm denotes the management fee and fp denotes the performance fee specified in the
compensation contract. The high-water mark column in the table contains an indicator variable that reflects
the presence of the high-water mark provision in the compensation contract. The high-water mark is the
highest NAV the investor had with the hedge fund. The high-water mark provision requires the manager to
outperform the high-water mark in order to obtain the performance fee. The hurdle rate column contains
the hurdle rate value that restricts payment of the performance fee to cases where the fund outperformed the
hurdle rate. If the high-water mark and the hurdle rate are present in the compensation contract, then we
assume that the high-water mark is indexed with respect to the hurdle rate. The hedge fund manager has to
satisfy all the existing provisions in order to obtain the performance fees.
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Figure 1: Optimal portfolio with liquidation by the investor




























































This figure shows the optimal hedge fund leverage level (vertical axis) depending on the AUM to the high-
water mark ratio (horizontal axis) for time moments t = 0, t = 0.1, ... , t = 0.9, during the time interval
between the fee payment moments that correspond to t = 0 and t = 1. The pictures correspond to a case
where the investor liquidates the fund in case the AUM to the high-water mark ratio drops below 0.5 at the
fee payment moment. The dashed line represents the liquidation boundary, that is present only at the moment
the fee is paid. The investor can liquidate the fund only after the fees are paid. The margin requirement is
assumed to be equal to 0.5 which corresponds to the maximum leverage level equal to 2.
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Figure 2: Optimal portfolio with a liquidation by the prime broker




























































This figure shows the optimal hedge fund leverage level (vertical axis) depending on the AUM to the high-
water mark ratio (horizontal axis) for time moments t = 0, t = 0.1, ... , t = 0.9, during the time interval
between the fee payment moments that correspond to t = 0 and t = 1. The pictures correspond to a case
where the prime broker liquidates the fund in case the AUM to the high-water mark ratio drops below 0.5
at any point during the [0, 1] time interval. The dashed line represents the liquidation boundary. The margin
requirement is assumed to be equal to 0.5 which corresponds to the maximum leverage level equal to 2.
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Figure 3: CME margin requirements for S&P 500 futures contracts










This figure shows daily relative margin requirements imposed by Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) as a
function of time. The relative margin requirements are obtained as a ratio of a maintenance margin require-
ment in dollars to the value of the underlying S&P 500 futures contracts. The data sample is from January
2, 1986 to June 30, 2009. The horizontal axis corresponds to time and the vertical axis corresponds to the
relative margin level.
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Figure 4: Comparison of an average hedge fund leverage and an inverse of the CME margin
requirement

















Average Hedge Fund Leverage
Inverse of the CME margin requirement
This figure compares the average hedge fund leverage obtained in Ang et al. (2011) shown in solid line with
the inverse of the relative Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) margin requirement for S&P 500 futures
contracts obtained from the data used in Dudley and Nimalendran (2010) shown in dashed line. The value
axis for the average hedge fund leverage is on the left-hand side, while the value axis for the inverse of the
CME margin requirement is on the right-hand side. The data sample is monthly from December 2004 to June
2009.
99
Hedge Fund Risk Premia: Transparency, Liquidity, Complexity,
and Concentration∗
Sergiy Gorovyy† Olga Kuzmina‡
Abstract
We study risk premia associated with hedge fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and
concentration over April 2006 to March 2009. We directly measure these qualitative charac-
teristics by using the internal grades that a fund of funds attached to all the funds it invested
in, and which represents the unique information that cannot be obtained from quantitative
data alone. Consistent with factor models of risk premium, we find that during normal times
low-transparency, low-liquidity, and high-concentration funds delivered a return premium,
with economic magnitudes of 5% to 10% per year, while during bad states of the economy,
these funds experienced significantly lower returns. We offer a novel explanation for why
highly concentrated funds command a risk premium by revealing that their risk premium is
mostly prevalent among non-transparent funds where investors are unaware about the exact
risks they are facing and hence cannot diversify them away.
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1 Introduction
In the modern era of delegated portfolio management hedge funds constitute one of the most
interesting and complicated investment vehicles. Usually they operate in a way that does not
require them to disclose details about their operations. This does not mean that hedge funds
do not disclose this information, but that they are not obliged to do so and as a result the
level of disclosure is an internal decision by the hedge fund manager. The fund’s structure
and disclosure level is rarely modified during fund’s life since the fund’s investors expect it to
maintain the same structure and disclosure level during its operation. After 2008, however,
hedge funds began to offer more transparency on demand from government and investors.
Sometimes hedge funds use third party aggregation services such as “Riskmetrics” in order to
disclose more information on the aggregate risks of the fund without disclosing its particular
holdings.
The question of whether hedge funds should be required to disclose information regard-
ing their trades and positions is important, especially in the light of recent regulatory changes,
including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act passed in July 2010. This act requires
managers of hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management to regis-
ter with the Securities and Exchange Commission and become subject to its disclosure rules.
Although the consequences of this act are yet to be evaluated, in this paper we attempt to ex-
plore the connection between hedge fund reporting level and their returns. The primary goal
of this paper is, thus, to determine whether there is a significant return premium associated
with more secretive, less transparent hedge funds.
The contribution of our paper is three-fold. First of all, by using a novel proprietary
dataset obtained from a fund of funds that spans April 2006 to March 2009, we are able to
directly measure the transparency level of a fund, a qualitative characteristic that is missing
in public hedge fund databases, use it to uncover and quantify the non-transparency risk
premium which amounts to 5.4% per year. The data spans both good and bad states of the
economy allowing us to test the risk-premium story against the alternative of better managers
being selected into managing low-transparency funds. Second, by investigating how excess
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returns vary with other fund characteristics, such as fund liquidity, complexity of its strategy,
and concentration of its investments, we document the presense of several other risk premia
in a cross-section of hedge fund returns. Finally, we explore how transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration help explain the fund return volatility and capital inflows.
Few papers in the asset pricing literature have raised the issues of hedge fund trans-
parency, presumably due to the absence of adequate data to explore this question. Anson
(2002) outlines different types of transparency and discusses why investors may want higher
degree of transparency. Hedges (2007) overviews the key issues of hedge fund investment
from a practitioners perspective. Goltz and Schroder (2010) survey hedge fund managers
and investors on their reporting practices and find that the quality of hedge fund reporting
is considered to be an important investment criterion. Aggarwal and Jorion (2012) study
quantitatively effects of hedge funds’ decisions on whether to provide or not to provide man-
aged accounts to their investors. Managed accounts contain securities custodial in the client’s
name, who knows the exact account positions, while commingled accounts contain securities
custodial in manager’s name and clients do not generally know fund’s holdings. Aggarwal
and Jorion (2012) interpret the incidence of accepting managed accounts as indicating of the
willingness of the fund to offer transparency and do not relate the results to risk premiums. In
contrast to these studies, we are able to directly measure the level of transparency of a fund
by using proprietary scores that are based on formal and informal interactions with hedge
funds, such as internal reports, meetings with managers and phone calls made by a fund of
funds. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to explore and quantify the risk
premium associated with low transparency.
To illustrate the risk premium channel, let us consider a risk-averse investor who faces
two alternative hedge funds. If investing with one is more risky from the point of view
of investors, this fund will have to deliver superior returns during normal times in order to
attract any investment at all, i.e. investors are compensated for bearing risks. At some point
these risks will realize, and this is when the riskier fund underperforms.
To further relate this to transparency, hedge funds that choose to provide less informa-
tion about their positions and strategy details to investors leave investors uncertain about the
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underlying risks of investing with these hedge funds. In particular when a transparent fund
starts to diverge from its declared strategy, investors can quickly disinvest if they dislike the
change, while in case of a non-transparent fund investors will only learn about the change
in the fund strategy later and have to face the consequences. This means that risk-averse
investors should be compensated for bearing the risks associated with non-transparency. In
particular, during normal times, low-transparency hedge funds are expected to perform bet-
ter than high-transparency hedge funds by delivering an additional non-transparency risk
premium. During bad times, on the other hand, the risks associated with non-transparency
can realize, meaning that the low-transparency funds may deliver lower returns relative to
high-transparency funds.
The time frame of our dataset is April 2006 to March 2009, allowing separately study the
return premia over the good and bad states of the economy. In particular, this period covers
the collapse of large global investment banks – Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, in March
and September 2008, respectively. Investors feared being stuck with bad investments lead-
ing to a demand for transparency. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that non-transparency
risks indeed realized during the later period of our data. Indeed, our empirical results show
that during the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009, more transparent funds outper-
formed the less transparent funds by about 7.1% per year.
We also document a presence of a hedge fund illiquidity risk premium. This is consis-
tent with a large literature on risk premia associated with illiquidity across a variety of asset
classes.1 In general, an illiquidity premium is a premium for investment in more illiquid as-
sets. For example, when the investor faces two alternative assets with one being more liquid
than the other, she is able to disinvest from a more liquid asset with a lower loss when faced
with a liquidity shock. Therefore, risk-averse investors invest in less liquid assets only if they
expect to obtain superior returns. The most liquid funds in our dataset are the funds that both
invest in higher liquidity assets and have fewer restrictions with regard to investment with-
drawal (so fewer lockup restrictions). We estimate the illiquidity premium to be about 5.7%
1 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986) for the seminal contribution, as well as Pastor and Stambaugh (2003),
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
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to 7.8% per year depending on the empirical specification. This is consistent with Liang
(1999) and Aragon (2007) who show that funds with longer lockup periods outperform other
funds.
Given the richness of our dataset, we are also able to explore the risk premia associated
with more complicated strategies used by hedge funds, as well as more concentrated in-
vestments. We find that during normal times, high-complexity hedge funds underperformed
low-complexity hedge funds by 3.8% per year, while we do not find a significant underperfor-
mance afterwards. The complex funds are usually non-transparent and have medium or low
liquidity and therefore this complexity result is partially driven by hedge fund transparency
and liquidity. This points to a presence of a negative complexity risk premium among hedge
funds.
It is interesting to note that concentration of hedge fund investments should not matter
in the light of the standard finance theory due to the theoretical ability of investors to diver-
sify away the non-systematic (idiosyncratic) risks. This is in contrast to a recent empirical
study by Ang et al. (2009) who find that idiosyncratic volatility bears a significant negative
premium. In our paper we are able to offer a novel explanation of why investors may not be
able to diversify their risks, by exploring in which funds the concentration premium is most
pronounced. Intuitively, hedge fund investors should be compensated for the risks associ-
ated with concentrated investments of a fund when they do not know what constitutes these
investments, i.e. they do not know which risks to diversify away. Hence, we expect to see a
concentration risk premium only among the non-transparent hedge funds. Indeed, we verify
this prediction using the interactions between concentration and transparency variables in
our empirical setup.
Our paper is close in spirit to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) who use
SEC filing data to construct an ω−score, which is a combined measure of conflict of interests,
concentrated ownership, and leverage. They show that the ω−score is a significant predictor
of the projected fund life. In a subsequent paper, Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz
(2012) use proprietary due diligence data to construct an operational risk variable as a linear
combination of variables that correspond to mistakes in statements, internalized pricing, and
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presence of an auditor in the Big 4 group. We consider operational risk in a broader sense,
where the willingness of hedge fund managers to provide details of their strategies, as well as
hedge fund liquidity, investment concentration, and the ability of the investors to understand
fund’s operations are important.
We also study hedge fund return volatility and capital flows and find that the return
volatility can be partially explained by the high degree of hedge fund concentration and
liquidity, with up to 37% of the explained variation in the full-sample specification. During
each of the periods considered the difference between volatilities of high-concentration ver-
sus low-concentration funds constitutes on average 2% per year, while the volatility of high-
liquidity funds is on average about 1% lower than the volatility of low-liquidity funds. Both
these magnitudes are economically significant given that the average hedge fund volatility
over the sample is equal to 11.0% per year.
Finally, we also study how hedge fund capital flows are related to their transparency,
liquidity, complexity, and concentration and find that among our qualitative variables only
the level of liquidity can robustly explain capital flows across different periods in our sample.
In particular, we find that low-liquidity funds experienced heavier outflows, especially during
the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009, where the difference between the flows
from low-liquidity and high-liquidity funds amounted to 26.6 percent.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and variables used in
our study, Section 3 explains the estimation procedure and the empirical setup, Section 4
discusses the main results on the risk premia associated with transparency, liquidity, com-
plexity, and concentration, as well as additional results and robustness checks, and Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
We use a unique dataset obtained from a fund of funds that contains detailed fund-year in-
formation over the 2007–2009 period. This fund of funds is one of the largest in the U.S.
The data provide information on hedge fund returns net of fees, their assets under manage-
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ment, and long and short exposures. Most importantly, these data include scores for hedge
fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration as rated by the fund of funds on
a scale from 1 to 4. Each year, at the end of March, the fund of funds grades all the hedge
funds it invests in based on its interactions with them during the previous twelve months.
These interactions consist of weekly or monthly reports to the fund of funds, meetings with
managers, phone calls, etc. Due to the nature of the scoring process and a significant level
of effort put into the construction of the scores we feel confident that they represent unique
information about funds’ operation that cannot be captured by the quantitative data alone.
Such qualitative measures are not present in public hedge fund databases, such as CISDM,
HFR, or TASS. Therefore, we think our data are especially well-suited for studying the return
premia associated with different qualitative characteristics of hedge funds.
The definitions of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration as used by the
fund of funds are natural and intuitive. In particular, hedge fund transparency represents
the willingness of the hedge fund manager to share information about the fund’s current
activities and investments with its investors. Hedge fund liquidity measures the liquidity
of investments with the hedge fund from the point of view of investors. It comprises both
the liquidity of the fund’s assets and restrictions on withdrawal from the fund, such as the
presence and the length of lockup periods. Hedge fund complexity corresponds to the com-
plexity of the hedge fund strategy and its operations. For example, an offshore hedge fund
that uses derivative instruments and swap agreements is considered to be complicated, since
it is very hard for investors to understand exactly the kinds of risks it faces by investing with
this fund. Finally, hedge fund concentration represents the level of concentration of hedge
fund investments.
After filtering out various versions of the funds we are left with 355 observations of 167
different hedge funds that are evenly spread across the three years, with 121 observations
in 2007, 122 – in 2008, and 112 – in 2009. Since our qualitative grades are given at the
end of March, we use 2007, 2008, and 2009 to denote April 2006 to March 2007, April
2007 to March 2008, April 2008 to March 2009 periods, correspondingly. For example,
the annualized return of a fund from April 2006 to March 2007 is matched to transparency,
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liquidity, complexity, and concentration grades that the fund of funds issued at the end of
March 2007. This approach ensures that all interactions with the hedge fund that constitute
the basis for the grades are conducted in the same period when the fund return is realized.
Our time frame is purposefully divided into three very distinct periods, since the risk
premium story predicts different funds to perform better during good versus bad states of the
economy. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), the period from April
2006 to March 2007 can be considered a normal year. The beginning of the period from
April 2007 to March 2008 also corresponds to a good state of the economy, but the end of
this period was already associated with a recession in US. The collapse of Bear Stearns in
March 2008 declared the beginning of the financial crisis, so we treat April 2007 to March
2008 as an intermediary period. Finally, April 2008 to March 2009 was clearly a period
corresponding to a bad state of the economy, highlighted by the bankruptcy filing by Lehman
Brothers, one of the largest investment banks. 2 The exogeneity of the global financial crisis
allows us to test the risk premium explanation, since we are able to observe both the return
premia during normal times as well as manifestations of the corresponding risks during the
crisis period.
Hedge funds in our dataset represent a broad set of strategies. In particular, there are
credit (CR), event-driven (ED), equity (EQ), relative-value (RV), and tactical trading (TT)
hedge funds. Credit hedge funds trade mostly corporate bonds and CDS on those bonds;
event-driven hedge funds seek to predict market moves based on specific news announce-
ments; equity hedge funds trade equities; relative value hedge funds implement pair trades
where one asset is believed to outperform another asset independent of macro events; and
tactical trading funds speculate on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities,
equities and bonds.
Each fund is identified by a single strategy, which is time invariant for a given hedge
fund (at least during the period considered). Panel A of Table 1 tabulates the number of
hedge funds by various strategies for each of the periods considered. Approximately half of
2 It is also worth mentioning, that according to NBER April 2006 to November 2007 was an expansion
period while December 2007 to March 2009 was a recession period.
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the hedge funds in the database are equity funds, with relative-value and event-driven as the
next popular strategies. This distribution of strategies across funds is comparable to other
databases, as reported, for example, by Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) for TASS.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, 25-th, 50-th, and 75-th per-
centiles, and the number of observations for hedge fund annualized returns, volatility, and
assets under management (AUM) separately for each of the periods considered. Hedge funds
performed well as a group during the normal period from April 2006 to March 2007 deliv-
ering on average a 13.59% per annum return with a 6.53% standard deviation. During the
intermediate period they delivered on average a 3.72% return with a higher 10.92% volatil-
ity, while during the crisis period they delivered on average a negative -16.56% return with
a 15.81% volatility.
The funds in our dataset are somewhat larger than funds in CISDM, HFR, or TASS
databases, since we filter out copies of the same funds, that although legally constitute dif-
ferent hedge funds are in fact just different versions of the same fund (and hence have same
returns, as well as transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration scores). An exam-
ple of such situation would be an onshore and an offshore versions of a fund (different for
tax treatment) or versions denominated in different currencies that have identical portfolios.
Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) use the same data to explore hedge fund leverage and
note that funds in the dataset are not subject to selection bias. Therefore, we are confident
that funds in our dataset are representative of the hedge fund industry.
For each of the qualitative characteristics (transparency, liquidity, complexity, and con-
centration), we define their High, Medium, and Low levels. The fund of funds gives original
grades in such a way that a grade of 1 represents the lowest level of the characteristic from
the point of view of risk for an investor. In particular, funds with high levels of transparency
and liquidity and funds with low levels of complexity and concentration are rated with a 1.
For consistency purposes and the ease of interpretation we define all the variables in such
a way that a High value represents a high level of the variable itself rather than a high level
of problem with that variable. Therefore, whenever we speak of high transparency or high
complexity, for example, we always mean a high level of transparency and a high level of
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complexity, respectively. We define Medium and Low levels in a similar way. There is a very
small percentage of funds that are ever rated with a 4, hence we combine the grades of 3 and
4 into one category in order to ensure that we have a reasonable number of observations in
each category.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the pairwise rank correlations between transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration, computed using Kendall’s (1938) τB-method to account for
the categorical nature of the variables and ties, for each year. As can be seen from these
results, the pairwise correlations are quite robust over time. More transparent funds are also
more liquid, with the correlation statistically significant at the 5% level for 2007 and at the
10% level for 2008 and 2009. More transparent and more liquid funds are also less complex
on average. Finally, more liquid funds are also less concentrated. These results document
the interesting patterns in the cross-sectional distribution of fund characteristics.
3 Empirical Strategy
We study the hedge fund return premia associated with transparency, liquidity, complexity,

































+ γX ′it + dt + ǫit
where rit denotes the annual excess return of fund i in year t. α is a set of regression
coefficients with respect to the corresponding indicator variables Dit, where the subscript
refers to the qualitative characteristic of the fund (transparency, liquidity, complexity, or
concentration) and the superscript refers to the level of that characteristic (High or Medium).
For example, the indicator variable DHTran,it is equal to 1 if fund i in year t has a high level of
transparency, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the indicator variable DMCom,it is equal to 1 if fund
i in year t has a medium level of complexity, and 0 otherwise. In some specifications we
also allow for a vector of controls Xit that includes the return volatility and the logarithm of
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the fund’s assets under management, to account for a potential difference in performance of
funds that have different level of volatility or size.
Since risk premia for transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration can be dif-
ferent for different years, we estimate the above relationship separately for each year. Fur-
thermore, in our full-sample results that cover all three years of data we include year fixed
effects dt in order to account for macroeconomic effects that are common to all hedge funds.
Finally, ǫit denotes the error term in the above-specified regression model.
The “Low” levels of our qualitative variables of interest are naturally omitted in the
regression specification. Funds with Low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and
concentration serve as the base category. α-coefficients can be interpreted as the correspond-
ing risk premia with respect to these groups of funds.
Although there is a panel component to our data, the qualitative characteristics of in-
terest are highly persistent within a fund. For example, among all the funds that have a
transparency level present for two years or more, 89% actually have the same level of trans-
parency in all years. Similarly, 91%, 94%, and 83% of funds have the same level of liquidity,
complexity, and concentration, respectively, in all years. The observation that the fund dis-
closure level and its structure in general are rarely modified after the fund’s initiation is not
surprising, because fund investors expect the fund to maintain the same configuration over
time. Given the high persistency of fund qualitative characteristics, we do not attempt to
estimate the within-fund return premia for transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concen-
tration, especially since we believe that the cross-sectional relationship in this case is more
insightful.
We also include strategy fixed effects to allow for a differential performance of funds
pursuing different strategies in some regression specifications. Such specifications allow
to explore how fund returns vary with transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration
across funds of the same strategy or style. Finally, in all our specifications we report standard





We start with univariate regressions of hedge fund performance on the indicator variables
corresponding to our qualitative characteristics in order to take a first look at hedge funds
with different levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration. Table 2 re-
ports the results of such specifications. We see that, consistent with our predictions from
Section 1, high-transparency hedge funds and medium-transparency hedge funds consider-
ably underperformed the low-transparency hedge funds during the normal time period from
April 2006 to March 2007 (Panel A). This underperformance is statistically significant at the
1% significance level. Moreover, the economic magnitude of this coefficient is large, sug-
gesting for an average difference in returns between low- and high-transparency hedge funds
of 5.7% per year. At the same time, medium-transparency hedge funds underperformed
low-transparency hedge funds by 4.3% per year.
During the intermediate April 2007 to March 2008 period, the difference in performance
becomes less significant both economically and statistically. During the crisis period (April
2008 to March 2009), however, we see a clear reversal in the sign of the difference between
high-transparency and low-transparency hedge fund returns. According to the theory, if risks
associated with low-transparency funds are realized in this period, we should see the high-
transparency funds to be performing better during this period. Indeed, the high-transparency
funds outperform the low-transparency funds by 7.1% per year. While economically large,
it is insignificant, due to the high volatility of returns during this period (as documented in
Panel B of Table 1, with a p-value of 14%.
Turning to our liquidity measure in Panel B, we observe that the difference in perfor-
mance between high- and low-liquidity hedge funds is even more pronounced than the dif-
ference in performance between high- and low-transparency hedge funds. Table 2 reports
that during April 2006 to March 2007 period high-liquidity hedge funds underperformed
low-liquidity hedge funds by 7.8% per year and medium-liquidity hedge funds underper-
formed low-liquidity hedge funds by 5.5% year, with both coefficients highly economically
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and statistically significant. In the intermediate April 2007 to March 2008 period we observe
that the signs of the coefficients are reversed with high-liquidity hedge funds outperforming
low-liquidity hedge funds by 8.2%. Finally, during the crisis period we observe that high-
liquidity hedge funds outperformed low liquidity hedge funds by an extraordinary 28.2%,
while medium-liquidity hedge funds outperfomed them by 13.3%. These results are again
both highly economically and statistically significant. Consistent with the illiquidity-risk
premium story, during the good period low-liquidity funds deliver higher return as a com-
pensation for the illiquidity risk premium, while during the bad period the risk manifests in
the underperformance of these funds.
Interestingly, we do not find any evidence for the existence of a risk premium associated
with the complexity of the strategies employed by funds, at least in the univariate framework.
The results in Table 2, Panel C suggest that there is no statistical or economical difference
between returns of high-complexity and low-complexity funds in all periods. This suggests
that the risk premium associated with fund complexity is small, if it exists at all.
We also observe a premium for hedge fund concentration reported in Table 2, Panel
D. During the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period, highly concentrated hedge funds
outperform low-concentration funds by 7.4%, while medium-concentration funds outperfom
low-concentration hedge funds by 4.4%. During April 2007 to March 2008, we observe
that the realized risk premium is close to zero and during the crisis period of April 2008 to
March 2009, we see a reversal with highly concentrated hedge funds underperforming low-
concentration hedge funds by 12.3%. These results are consistent with the existence of risk
premium associated with more concentrated (less diversified) funds.
In the last column of each panel in Table 2 we consider regressions that include all three
time periods and allow for a different average return in each year by including year fixed
effects. We observe that the coefficients for transparency and concentration lose their sig-
nificance. This is not surprising in light of the risk premium story, since our three years
both cover the years of expansion and the years of recession. Low and insignificant co-
efficients for the qualitative variables over time rule out the alternative story where fund
managers with persistently better performance are selected into managing low-transparency
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and/or high-concentration funds. The exogenous variation introduced by the downturn of the
economy in 2008-2009 enables us to observe the performance of funds in different states of
the world, and to provide a direct support for the risk premium story that is represented by
funds earning a positive premium during growth periods and negative premium during crisis
periods when the embedded risk manifests.
We observe that the difference in performance between high- and low-liquidity funds is
positive and significant, which seems to be driven by the very high difference in performance
between high-liquidity and low-liquidity hedge funds during the crisis period. Since the
recession years are less frequent than the growth periods, we expect the significance of the
liquidity coefficient to drop if the time frame of the study was increased.
In light of the above results it is interesting to explore whether the documented risk
premia still exists if we take a more general approach allowing for all of our measures to
influence returns at the same time, as well as investigate whether our results are driven by
other potential factors such as fund return volatility, size or the strategy employed. This is
the approach we take next.
4.2 Multivariate Results
Table 3 reports the results of multivariate regressions that use all of our qualitative vari-
ables at the same time, as well as controls for hedge fund size, volatility and strategy. These
results are very similar to the results we obtained in univariate regressions. For example, dur-
ing the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period, high-transparency funds underperformed
low-transparency funds by 5.4% per year, controlling for the level of other qualitative char-
acteristics. At the same time, high-liquidity funds underperformed low-liquidity funds by
5.7% per year or 6.1% in the specification which includes additional controls for the size of
the hedge fund, its return volatility and its strategy.
It is important to control for all of our qualitative characteristics at the same time, since
many of them are correlated with each other, as reported in Panel C of Table 1. The results
in Table 3, however, suggest that each of the main variables of interest is important irrespec-
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tive of the values of other variables, and the risk premium for low-transparency funds, for
instance, is not driven by illiquidity or concentration premia. These results are also robust
to the inclusion of the logarithm of assets under management (a proxy for the size of the
hedge fund), return volatility, and strategy fixed effects, suggesting that the observed risk
premia are not driven by funds being larger or more volatile, or by a potentially different
performance of funds employing different strategies3 .
Similar to our univariate results, the regression coefficients are mostly insignificant dur-
ing the intermediate April 2007 to March 2008 period, while during the crisis period we ob-
serve a reversal in the signs of the coefficients for high-transparency and high- and medium-
liquidity funds, with the latter two being statistically significant at the 1% level both in the
specifications with and without additional controls.
In contrast to the univariate regression results we find some evidence of a low-complexity
risk premium. In particular, we observe that high-complexity funds significantly under-
performed the low-complexity funds during the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period
by about 3.7%-3.9% per year. This suggests that the absence of evidence towards a low-
complexity risk premium in the univariate case (Panel C of Table 2) is likely driven by a
negative correlation of complexity with transparency and liquidity (as reported by Panel C
of Table 1), given that high levels of both command a return premium during normal times.
It is therefore important to look at all qualitative variables together in order to implicitly
account for interrelations between them. The results in Table 3 can thus be interpreted as
the presence of risk premia associated with low transparency, low liquidity, low complexity
and high concentration, conditional on the level of all qualitative characteristics as well as
additional controls.
During the final period we find a significant negative effect of past return volatility on
future fund returns which is connected to higher on average sales of assets belonging to high
3 Ideally, we would like to estimate a separate specification for each strategy to explore potential differences
in magnitudes of the risk premia across various strategies. However, the number of strategy-year observations
is too small to fit so many parameters, so we have to leave this intriguing question for future research. Instead,
we estimate a set of specifications where we drop one strategy at a time and find that the results are robust.
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volatility funds. This is explained in part by withdrawals and in part by reduction in hedge
fund leverage. We observe no size premium during any of the three periods.
4.3 Robustness Checks
The data sample consists of observations when the fund of funds actually chose to invest with
a given fund in a given year, so a potential concern for our results is that the fund of funds
selected a different subsample of funds every year and for this reason some high-transparent
funds underperformed some low-transparent funds in the normal period from April 2006 to
March 2007 while other high-transparent funds outperformed other low-transparent funds
in the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009. To explore further the issue of the
selection and as a robustness check, we also provide the results of estimating the same set of
specifications in a balanced panel in Table 4, where we require funds to be present during all
three periods. This leaves us with 73 observations per year.
We note that the magnitudes of the risk premia associated with transparency and liquidity
are almost identical when we require the funds to be present in all three periods. Further-
more, the picture with regard to complexity and concentration risk premia becomes even
more clear. In particular, controlling for other qualitative characteristics, high-complexity
funds underperformed low-complexity funds by 5.2% per year during the normal April 2006
to March 2007 period. When we additionally control for volatility, size of the fund, and
strategy employed, this coefficient stays highly statistically significant with a simillar eco-
nomic magnitude of 4.6% per year. Interestingly, high-concentration funds overperformed
low-concentration funds by 10.5% per year, or 8.5% per year when additional controls are
taken into account. Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that our results are not
driven by a different composition of funds from year to year, but rather by the same funds
earning a risk premium during good times and facing a loss when a negative economy shock
realizes.
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4.4 Concentration and Transparency Interactions
The results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide evidence for the presence of various risk premia,
in particular the one associated with high levels of concentration of hedge fund investments.
Standard finance theory, however, suggests that investors should be able to diversify away all
non-systematic (idiosyncratic) risk (see Markowitz, 1952, for the seminal paper). Therefore,
such a premium should exist only if investors’ diversification capabilities are limited.4
To the best of our knowledge the question of why investors do not fully diversify the
risks associated with holding a concentrated portfolio has not been explored in the context
of hedge funds. Concentration should command a premium when hedge fund investors do
not know hedge fund holdings and hence cannot diversify associated risks away. On the
other hand, when investors perfectly know what underlying assets the fund is trading, even if
the fund is concentrated, they can diversify the corresponding risks and hence concentration
should not require a risk premium.
In terms of our empirical framework, this suggests that we should observe a concentration
risk premium mainly among low-transparency funds. To test this hypothesis, we regress fund
excess returns on their qualitative characteristics (transparency, liquidity, complexity, and
concentration) by year, where we additionally introduce all pairwise interactions of the levels
of transparency and concentration. Indeed, the results in Table 5 suggest that it is exactly the
low-transparency high-concentration funds that command a return premium during normal
times.
In particular, during the April 2006 to March 2007 period among the low-transparency
funds, high-concentration funds earned 11.7% more than the low-concentration ones, where
this difference is significant at a 1% level. At the same time, among the high-transparency
funds the return premium of high-concentration funds over the low-concentration funds con-
stituted a mere 11.7%− 9.6% = 2.1% per year, which is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. The −9.6% difference between these two return premia thus has an interpretation of a
difference-in-differences estimate and is significant at a 1% level. Overall, the results of Ta-
4 See, for example, Merton (1987).
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ble 5 corroborate our intuition that investors are in fact able to diversify the risks associated
with investing in funds that hold concentrated asset portfolios as long as their portfolios are
transparent.
4.5 Hedge Fund Volatility and Flows
In this section, we investigate the effect of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentra-
tion on hedge fund volatilities and flows. Hedge fund volatility is computed as an annualized
sample monthly return volatility using previous 12 monthly observations. Hedge fund 12-
month flow is equal to relative change in the fund’s AUM adjusted for fund’s return following
Ang et al. (2011).
Table 6 reports results of multivariate regressions of hedge fund return volatility on trans-
parency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration indicators, for each year as well as for all
three years of data controlling for an average level of volatility using year fixed effects in the
last column. We observe that some portion of volatility can be attributed to these qualitative
variables, with up to 37% of explained variation in the full-sample specification. The signs
of the coefficients are in general similar across years. The high-liquidity funds are generally
less volatile, with a 0.9% lower annualized volatility as compared to low-liquidity funds.
This result is very intuitive since higher levels of liquidity of fund holdings lead to smaller
jumps in returns on a month-to-month basis as compared to those of illiquid funds which can
experience such jumps due to updates in prices of their assets. This evidence is consistent
with the one presented in Huberman and Halka (2001) who document that more liquid stocks
have lower idiosyncratic volatilities. As expected, this effect is most pronounced during the
crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009, given that the overall propensity to experience
sudden changes in asset prices is higher during this period.
We also observe high-concentration hedge funds to be significantly more volatile than
the low-concentration funds, with a difference in annualized volatility of about 2% across
different specifications. This is intuitive as high-concentration funds diversify less, so simi-
lar shocks to prices lead to larger changes in returns of these funds compared to the low-
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concentration funds. This magnitude is economically significant given that the average
hedge fund volatility over the sample is equal to 11.0% per year. Interestingly, we do not
find any difference in volatility of hedge fund returns between high-transparency and low-
transparency funds.
Finally, we also study how hedge fund capital flows are related to their transparency,
liquidity, complexity, and concentration by considering multivariate regressions of hedge
fund flows on these variables. Results of the regressions are reported in Table 7. We find that
hedge fund flows are in general very volatile and that among our qualitative variables only
the liquidity characteristic can robustly explain capital flows across different periods in our
sample. In particular, we find that high-liquidity funds experienced bigger inflows than low-
liquidity funds, especially during the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009. Given
that the actual values of these flows were negative, we interpret this result as low-liquidity
funds experiencing heavier outflows than high-liquidity funds, with the difference of about
26.6 percentage points.
5 Conclusion
We use proprietary data obtained from a fund of funds to study the risk premia associated
with hedge fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration. We directly measure
the transparency level of a fund, a qualitative characteristic that is missing in public hedge
fund databases, and estimate a non-transparency risk premium of 5.4% per year during nor-
mal times. We also have qualitative measures of hedge fund liquidity, complexity, and con-
centration. We estimate an illiquidity premium of 6.1% per year during normal times. We do
not find a premium for hedge fund complexity with high-complexity funds significantly un-
derperforming during normal times. With regard to hedge fund concentration risk premium
we find that it is concentrated in high-concentration low-transparency funds. We estimate
a high-concentration low-transparency premium of 11.7% during normal times. This is a
premium investors require in order to invest in concentrated hedge funds which risks they
cannot diversify since investors do not know the area where the risks are concentrated. This
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result can be interpreted as a novel explanation for why investors cannot diversify away the
non-systematic risks.
Importantly, the use of the data that come from both good and bad states of the economy
allows us to directly test the risk-premium story against the alternative of better managers
being selected into funds which belong to one of the categories. According to the risk pre-
miums story we find that during normal times low transparency, low liquidity, and high
concentration and low transparency funds deliver a premium, while during bad times risks
manifest and these funds underperform.
Finally, we explore how transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration help ex-
plain the fund return volatility and capital flows. In particular, the returns of high-liquidity
and low-concentration funds are less volatile. This result is not surprising since high con-
centration of illiquid investments can lead to significant jumps in hedge fund returns. With
regard to hedge fund capital flows we find that during the crisis period low-liquidity funds
experienced significantly heavier outflows than high-liquidity funds.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Data
Panel A: Number of funds by strategy
Strategy 2007 2008 2009
CR 11 13 10
ED 18 19 20
EQ 65 65 51
RV 20 20 25
TT 7 5 6
Total 121 122 112
Panel B: Hedge fund characteristics
Variable Year Mean Std q25 q50 q75 N
Return 2007 13.59% 8.62% 9.03% 13.32% 18.02% 121
2008 3.72% 14.52% -5.00% 2.61% 10.58% 122
2009 -16.56% 19.64% -28.30% -16.21% -5.32% 112
Volatility 2007 6.53% 4.34% 3.68% 5.89% 7.80% 121
2008 10.92% 6.70% 6.44% 9.04% 13.09% 122
2009 15.81% 10.06% 9.30% 12.67% 20.38% 112
AUM 2007 905m 1.67b 128m 364m 1.05b 121
2008 1.04b 1.86b 145m 399m 1.28b 122
2009 810m 1.47b 121m 249m 1.03b 112
Panel C: Pairwise rank correlations of qualitative variables by year
Year Transparency Liquidity Complexity Concentration
2007 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.187∗∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.144∗ −0.155∗ 1.000
Concentration −0.025 −0.175∗∗ 0.090 1.000
2008 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.159∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.335∗∗∗ −0.159∗ 1.000
Concentration 0.071 −0.140∗ −0.135 1.000
2009 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.147∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.269∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ 1.000
Concentration 0.073 −0.193∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ 1.000
This table reports various descriptive statistics of our data. Panel A reports the number of funds in our sample
by strategy by year. CR denotes credit hedge funds, ED – event-driven hedge funds, EQ – equity hedge funds,
RV – relative-value hedge funds, and TT – tactical-trading hedge funds. 2007 stands for April 2006 to March
2007, 2008 – for April 2007 to March 2008, and 2009 – for April 2008 to March 2009. Panel B reports the
summary statistics of hedge fund returns, volatility, and assets under management (AUM) for each of the time
periods. Mean denotes the annualized sample average, Std denotes the annualized sample standard deviation,
q25, q50, and q75 denote the 25-th, 50th, and the 75th percentiles, respectively. Finally, N denotes the number
of observations. Panel C reports the pairwise rank correlations between transparency, liquidity, complexity, and
concentration, computed using Kendall’s (1938) τB-method to account for the categorical type of the variables
and ties. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 2: Hedge fund performance: Univariate regression results
Panel A: Transparency
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.057∗∗∗ −0.039 0.071 −0.015
(0.020) (0.046) (0.048) (0.024)
Medium −0.043∗∗ −0.029 −0.008 −0.024
(0.018) (0.035) (0.043) (0.022)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.007 0.018 0.352
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Liquidity High −0.078∗∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.042) (0.034) (0.022)
Medium −0.055∗∗∗ 0.045 0.133∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.018) (0.032) (0.035) (0.019)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.036 0.251 0.385
Panel C: Complexity
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Complexity High −0.010 0.020 0.031 0.014
(0.016) (0.045) (0.050) (0.026)
Medium 0.023 0.023 −0.027 0.004
(0.017) (0.027) (0.043) (0.020)
Observations 121 122 112 355




Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Concentration High 0.074∗ 0.008 −0.122∗∗ −0.020
(0.041) (0.037) (0.053) (0.029)
Medium 0.044∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.035 0.005
(0.013) (0.026) (0.038) (0.016)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.002 0.059 0.352
This table reports the results of linear univariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator
variables representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time
period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as
well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included. Panel A, B, C, and D report the results
for transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, respectively. The base category are the funds with
low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can
be interpreted as the corresponding return premia earned by high- and medium-level funds with respect to the
low-level groups of funds. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in
full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
correspondingly.
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Table 3: Hedge fund performance: Multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.054∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.045 −0.022 0.052 0.035 −0.030 −0.009
(0.019) (0.022) (0.048) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.024) (0.024)
Medium −0.042∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.025 −0.019 −0.027 0.006 −0.030 −0.012
(0.018) (0.021) (0.039) (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019)
Liquidity High −0.057∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.063 0.279∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.024) (0.023)
Medium −0.051∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗ 0.056 0.032 0.156∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.018) (0.022) (0.036) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) (0.021) (0.019)
Complexity High −0.037∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗ 0.021 −0.075 0.064 −0.012 0.016 −0.053
(0.013) (0.020) (0.049) (0.063) (0.043) (0.052) (0.024) (0.033)
Medium 0.001 −0.004 0.040 0.037 0.024 −0.021 0.016 −0.004
(0.016) (0.020) (0.031) (0.044) (0.045) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
Concentration High 0.057 0.088∗∗ 0.027 0.018 −0.044 0.050∗ 0.004 0.062∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.043) (0.037) (0.035) (0.051) (0.029) (0.028) (0.023)
Medium 0.039∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.004 0.021 −0.002 −0.003 0.015 0.036∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(AUM) −0.003 0.016∗ 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
Volatility −1.390 −0.637 −4.705∗∗∗ −3.581∗∗∗
(0.985) (0.891) (0.378) (0.370)
Strategy fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 121 121 122 122 112 112 355 355
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.249 0.063 0.290 0.300 0.722 0.394 0.566
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator variables representing different fund charac-
teristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008
to March 2009), as well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included. The base category are the funds with low levels of transparency,
liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding return premia earned by high- and
medium-level funds with respect to the low-level groups of funds. Every other column also includes the controls for the size of the hedge fund (proxied by
the logarithm of its assets under management), annualized volatility, and strategy fixed effects. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to
within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 4: Hedge fund performance: Balanced panel multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.058∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.096∗ 0.008 0.065 0.038 −0.035 −0.015
(0.024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.044) (0.042) (0.035) (0.029) (0.026)
Medium −0.045∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.080∗ −0.038 −0.043 −0.007 −0.047∗ −0.020
(0.018) (0.018) (0.042) (0.036) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022)
Liquidity High −0.059∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.018) (0.027) (0.067) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.036) (0.030)
Medium −0.043∗∗ −0.041∗∗ 0.043 0.023 0.164∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.023
(0.017) (0.020) (0.049) (0.040) (0.037) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025)
Complexity High −0.052∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ 0.044 −0.004 0.042 −0.063 0.008 −0.057
(0.016) (0.016) (0.071) (0.072) (0.044) (0.047) (0.036) (0.044)
Medium −0.025 −0.024∗ 0.029 0.059 0.075 0.007 0.018 0.008
(0.015) (0.014) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
Concentration High 0.105∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.024 −0.089 0.010 −0.006 0.056∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.049) (0.057) (0.059) (0.029) (0.038) (0.025)
Medium 0.036∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.031 0.049 −0.019 −0.005 0.019 0.047∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.038) (0.041) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Ln(AUM) −0.005 0.032∗∗ 0.010 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005)
Volatility 0.467∗ 0.116 −1.371∗∗∗ −1.104∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.511) (0.100) (0.115)
Strategy fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 219 219
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.520 0.168 0.410 0.340 0.831 0.511 0.683
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator variables representing different fund charac-
teristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008
to March 2009), as well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included, on a balanced panel of funds. The base category are the funds with
low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding return
premia earned by high- and medium-level funds with respect to the low-level groups of funds. Every other column also includes the controls for the size
of the hedge fund (proxied by the logarithm of its assets under management), annualized volatility, and strategy fixed effects. Standard errors, robust to
heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 5: Hedge fund performance: Transparency and concentration interaction results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.043∗ 0.093 0.078 0.021
(0.023) (0.074) (0.061) (0.035)
Medium −0.040∗ 0.094 −0.007 0.008
(0.023) (0.074) (0.059) (0.035)
Liquidity High −0.059∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.050) (0.041) (0.025)
Medium −0.051∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.042) (0.039) (0.023)
Complexity High −0.034∗∗ 0.065 0.069 0.030
(0.016) (0.055) (0.048) (0.026)
Medium 0.002 0.060∗ 0.030 0.024
(0.022) (0.034) (0.048) (0.024)
Concentration High 0.117∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ −0.035 0.085∗
(0.024) (0.081) (0.031) (0.050)
Medium 0.025 0.145∗ 0.013 0.065∗
(0.033) (0.082) (0.061) (0.038)
Interactions High&High −0.096∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.078
(0.033) (0.125) (0.072) (0.061)
High&Med 0.005 −0.217∗∗ −0.083 −0.096∗
(0.048) (0.108) (0.090) (0.050)
Med&High −0.062 −0.273∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.091
(0.074) (0.096) (0.094) (0.065)
Med&Med 0.018 −0.156∗ −0.036 −0.051
(0.036) (0.093) (0.072) (0.043)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.119 0.305 0.400
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator
variables representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time
period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as
well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included. Additionally the regressions include the
interactions between transparency and concentration variables. The first level in the interaction terms notation
represents the level of transparency, while the last one corresponds to the level of concentration. For example,
High&Med is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a fund has a high level of transparency and a medium
level of concentration. The base category are the funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity,
and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding return premia
earned by high- and medium-level funds with respect to the low-level groups of funds. Standard errors, robust
to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 6: Hedge fund return volatility: Multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High 0.0041 0.0035 −0.0046 0.0026
(0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0036)
Medium 0.0026 −0.0002 0.0064 0.0035
(0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0024)
Liquidity High 0.0029 −0.0131∗∗ −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0036)
Medium 0.0010 −0.0112∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0043
(0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0033)
Complexity High −0.0037 −0.0046 0.0008 −0.0024
(0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0028)
Medium −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0042 −0.0076∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0072) (0.0032)
Concentration High 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0095) (0.0042)
Medium 0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0020 0.0012
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0021)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.298 0.213 0.373
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund return volatilities on indi-
cator variables representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each
time period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009),
as well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included. The base category are the funds with
low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can
be interpreted as the corresponding volatility difference between high- and medium-level funds as compared to
the low-level groups of funds. Volatility is equal to an annualized sample monthly return volatility calculated
using previous 12 months. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation
in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels correspondingly.
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Table 7: Hedge fund flows: Multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High 0.222 0.453 −0.031 0.205
(0.237) (0.420) (0.077) (0.173)
Medium 0.096 0.100 −0.070 0.046
(0.157) (0.230) (0.058) (0.095)
Liquidity High 0.157 0.240 0.266∗∗∗ 0.224
(0.370) (0.392) (0.092) (0.197)
Medium −0.265∗ −0.067 0.155∗∗ −0.056
(0.152) (0.211) (0.062) (0.093)
Complexity High 0.283∗ 0.297 0.120 0.235∗
(0.168) (0.361) (0.077) (0.140)
Medium −0.061 0.265 0.156∗∗ 0.139
(0.174) (0.175) (0.069) (0.085)
Concentration High 0.233 −0.026 0.091 0.087
(0.201) (0.194) (0.068) (0.098)
Medium 0.280∗ 0.062 0.045 0.141
(0.163) (0.197) (0.063) (0.094)
Observations 109 107 95 311
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.055 0.123 0.189
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund inflows (measured as a
percentage of past assets under management) on indicator variables representing different fund characteristics,
as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April
2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as well as for all three years, where the year fixed
effects are included. The base category are the funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity,
and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding volatility
difference between high- and medium-level funds as compared to the low-level groups of funds. Hedge fund
flow is equal to a relative change in the fund’s AUM adjusted for fund’s returns during previous 12 months.
Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
